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Abstract
This thesis is about portfolio choice under ambiguity and risk. At its core
is an experiment and a simulation, both concerning portfolio choice. The
experiment is under ambiguity, in which the the probabilities of the states are
not known to the subjects. We tested two multiple prior preference theories
(MEU and α-MEU), both of which are fit significantly better than Expected
Utility (EU) for around one third of the subjects, and better than Mean-
Variance (MV) for the majority of the subjects. We also find that subjects
have heterogenous beliefs about ambiguity, but on average they do a good
job in guessing the true probabilities. The simulation is in the context of risk.
Our interest here is in the specification of the stochastic process underlying
our observations. The simulation led to a surprising result - the maximum
likelihood estimation may suggest the wrong specification.
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Chapter 1
Portfolio Choice under
Ambiguity - Theory
1.1 Introduction
This chapter begins by presenting the classic individual portfolio choice prob-
lem in the context of risk. The environment is that there is one risk free asset,
for which the end of period price is fixed, and several risky assets, for which
the end of period prices are contingent on the possible states. The proba-
bilities of each state are known to the individuals. The starting prices of all
the assets are predetermined and individuals can buy or sell the assets using
a cash endowment. Section 1.2 studies the scenario in which individuals can
buy and sell any quantity of assets. Section 1.3 studies the scenario with a
No-short-selling constraint, which means that individuals can only use their
cash endowment to buy the assets and they can not borrow cash.
Clearly the optimal decision depends upon the preferences of the decision-
maker. In this chapter, Expected Utility (EU) and Mean-Variance (MV) pref-
erences are applied in this scenario. EU theory is widely used by economists
to explain decision making under risk. It claims that individuals’ decision
rules can be described as maximising the sum of probability weighted von
1
2Neumann-Morgenstern utility of every possible outcome (the EU theory as-
sumes that the individuals obey certain axioms.) 1 While EU theory is widely
favoured by economists, it is not the most preferred preference functional
used in the financial professions. There people work directly with the ex-
pected return and variance of a gamble, and assume that decision-makers
trade off the mean against the variance. In general, but not always, EU
preferences are inconsistent with MV preferences and vice versa. However
assuming MV preferences has advantages in that interesting analytical results
can be obtained, which is often not possible when assuming EU preferences.
MV preferences are also easier to handle when doing empirical work. For ex-
ample, in the empirical study of the Capital Asset Pricing Model, the return
on the asset is usually assumed to be normally distributed, and the corre-
sponding return and variance can be derived from historical data. Though
MV preferences may imply violation of statewise dominance (hence one might
think it is not a rational preference), it is the building block for Modern Port-
folio Theory (MPT). MPT was introduced by Markowitz (1952), who won a
Nobel Prize for this research, and it has been widely used in practice.
The chapter then studies, in Section 1.4, the portfolio choice problem in the
context of ambiguity. Ambiguity is distinguished from risk in the sense that
the probabilities of each state happening are not known by the individuals. In
both EU and MV, either a unique prior or a unique distribution is assumed.
There are various characterisations of ambiguity and behaviour under ambi-
guity, and we will study one such characterisation: that with multiple priors
- that is various sets of possible probabilities (in the case of risk, there is a
unique member of this set). To be specific we will apply two multiple-prior
models: the MaxMin Expected Utility (MEU) (Gilboa and Schmeidler 1989)
model and the α-MaxMin Expected Utility (α-MEU) (Ghirardato et al. 2004)
1Usually the axioms are described as the following (where P denotes a risky gamble)
• Axiom 1 Completeness Either P1  P2 or P1 ≺ P2 or P1 = P2
• Axiom 2 Transitivity If P1  P2 and P2  P3 then P1  P3
• Axiom 3 Continuity If P1  P2  P3 then there exists a value pi ∈ [0, 1] that
P1pi + P3(1− pi) = P2
• Axiom 4 Independence If P1  P2 then for any pi ∈ [0, 1]
3model in a portfolio choice problem. α-MEU is a generalisation of MEU, and
both of these two preferences are built ’on top of’ EU theory. The study
of ambiguity in portfolio choice may help us to understand puzzles which
cannot be explained by classical finance theory, such as the equity premium
puzzle. This latter refers to the phenomenon that the returns for stocks in
excess of government bonds are too great to be rationalised.
1.2 Unconstrained Portfolio Choice in the con-
text of risk
1.2.1 Introduction
The general environment is as follows. There are several assets with starting
prices predetermined, and with end-of-period prices depending on which state
occurs out of all the possible states. There is one risk free asset, for which
the end of period price is the same for all possible states, as a fixed interest
rate is assumed. The others are risky assets, for which end-of-period prices
are contingent on the state which occurs. For any one state that occurs, all
the end-of-period prices of the risky assets are determined.The risky assets
may be correlated in terms of their end-of-period prices. The end-of-period
price could also be considered as the end-of-period price plus a dividend as
sometimes dividend are paid on some stocks. But these two interpretations
do not make a real difference to the theoretical analysis. Individuals are given
a certain amount of cash endowment at the start, and then they can buy or
sell the assets. In this thesis, we exclusively study the case in which there
are 2 risky assets and 1 risk free asset. This is for the following reasons.
The study of portfolio choice are mainly focused on two aspects. One is how
individuals allocate cash to the risk free asset and the risky assets, and the
other is how they diversify in risky assets. Diversification means hedging risk
by constructing a portfolio containing several risky assets, as risky assets may
be correlated. For example, the famous CAPM model (which assumes that
individuals have mean variance preferences) claims that every individual wants
4to choose a portfolio with the same weights in risky assets, that is market
portfolio; the heterogeneity in risk aversion only influences the proportion in
the risk free asset and in market portfolio;. So a risk free asset and also at
least two risky assets should be involved in this study. As the analysis in
the case of two risky assets already captures the essence of portfolio choice
theory, no more should be added, since this would make the problem more
complicated in a unnecessary way. Also, I want to test the theoretical results
in the experiment. As to the number of possible states, we chose to study
the case where there are 3 possible states. First, at least two states should
be involved as otherwise the risky assets are not risky anymore when only
one state can occur. But two states are not informative enough in terms
of revealing individuals’ preferences (as we shall show later). Second, the
problem should be as simple as possible for the subjects. Then it seems
natural to choose 3 states. Although it is more explicit if we model the
payoffs for the assets in different states by prices, relative returns are used
instead in this chapter. This leads to a much conciser theoretical analysis
and does not alter the basic problem. For example2, if the opening prices for
risky asset 1 and risky asset 2 and risk free asset are 4, 2 and 1 units of cash
respectively, individuals should have exactly the same preferences when told
that the end of period prices to be 8, 3 and 1 units of cash respectively or
the relative returns are 1, 0.5 and 0 respectively. We also introduce another
simplification by assuming that the opening prices for all the assets are 1 unit
in cash since the opening price does not really matter as long as the relative
return is given. Furthermore the relative return for the risk free asset is
nomalised to 0. Note in this case the risk free asset and cash are equivalent.
So in future the risk free asset is just called cash.
1.2.2 The Basic Scenario
Assume that there are two risky assets i ∈ (1, 2), both priced at 1 unit
of cash. The relative return for risky assets are contingent on the state
j ∈ (1, 2, 3). Individuals are endowed with a certain amount of cash e to buy
2In this example only one state is assumed, as it is only for illustrating the idea.
5the risky assets. They can spend all their cash or they can keep as much as
they want. In this basic scenario short selling in any asset or cash is allowed.
Denoting by C =
[
c1 c2
]
the portfolio choice 3 for and the cash holding as
c0 as the remaining cash.
c0 = e− c1 − c2 (1.1)
The interest rate is 0, so the cash holding is the same at the end of period.
Denoting by dij the return for risky asset i if state j occurs, the return table
for the risky assets can be written as
state1 state2 state3
asset1 d11 d12 d13
asset2 d21 d22 d23
and it can be written in a concise matrix form
D =
[
d11 d12 d13
d21 d22 d23
]
(1.2)
Then the portfolio payoff for each state j is
wj = c1d1j1 + c2d2j1 + e
=
∑
i∈(1,2)
cidij
(1.3)
The probabilities of the possible states are denoted by the vector
P =
[
p1 p2 p3
]′
(1.4)
where ′ means a transpose operator for a vector/matrix. This notation is
used throughout the thesis.
3In this thesis, in order to simplify the notation, the expression ’portfolio choice’ always
refers to the allocations to the risky/ambiguous assets, as the allocation to cash is implicitly
decided by the budget constraint (1.1)
61.2.3 Mean Variance (MV) Preferences
Mean Variance preferences assumes that individuals trade-off the mean
against the variance of a portfolio. Given the return table (1.2) and proba-
bility vector (1.4), the mean return of asset i is
µi = di1p1 + di2p2 + di3p3 (1.5)
the variance of the return for asset i is
σ2i = (di1 − µi)2p1 + (di2 − µi)2p2 + (di3 − µi)2p3 (1.6)
and the covariance for returns of the two assets is
σ12 = (d11−µ1)(d21−µ2)p1 +(d11−µ1)(d21−µ2)p2 +(d11−µ1)(d21−µ2)p3
(1.7)
For conciser writing, denote the return vector by
µ =
[
µ1
µ2
]
(1.8)
and the covariance matrix by
Ω =
[
σ21 σ12
σ12 σ
2
2
]
(1.9)
For any allocation C =
[
c1 c2
]
the mean of portfolio (relative) payoff is
Cµ and the variance of portfolio (relative) payoff is CΩC
′
. Mean-Variance
preferences assumes that individuals maximise the following function
U = e+ Cµ− 1
2
rCΩC
′
(1.10)
= e+ (c1µ1 + c2µ2)− 1
2
r(c21σ
2
1 + 2c1c2σ12 + c
2
2σ2
2) (1.11)
7which is a linear combination of the mean and the variance of the portfolio
payoff 4. Notice that r ≥ 0 is the risk aversion parameter and represents the
degree an individual would penalize a portfolio for its risk. The first order
conditions for the maximisation of the function (1.10) are
dU
dc1
= µ1 − r(c1σ21 + c2σ12)
dU
dc2
= µ2 − r(c2σ22 + c1σ12)
hence the optimal allocation is given by
C∗ =
1
r
(Ω−1µ)
′
. (1.12)
Conditions for the existence of an optimal allocation The optimal
solution (1.12) is an expression involving the inverse of the covariance matrix
Ω, so its determinant should not be equal to 0; that is
σ212 − σ21σ22 6= 0 (1.13)
The intuition behind this condition is that it eliminates the opportunity for
individuals to earn a risk free profit without any cost, which is called an
Arbitrage Opportunity. In another words, there is not an optimal solution as
an individual would want to invest an unlimited amount in the risky assets if
such an opportunity exists. For example, if
µ =
[
0.1
0.3
]
and
Ω =
[
0.2 0.4
0.4 0.8
]
then the mean of the portfolio payoff is 0.1c1 + 0.3c2 and the variance of the
payoff is 0.2c21 + 0.8c1c2 + 0.8c
2
2. If an individual constructs the portfolio so
that c1 = −2c2 then the portfolio variance is 0. And the utility function for
4It is frequent mistake that people think quadratic utility functions leads to mean
variance preferences. See Robert and Edward (1991).
8a mean variance preference individual is
U = 0.1c2
which is monotonically increasing in c2. As the risk parameter does not
appear in this equation, an individual with any level of risk aversion would
be willing to buy an unlimited amount of asset 2 and sell half that amount
in asset 1. If
µ =
[
0.1
0.15
]
hence the utility function is
U = −0.05c2.
then an individual would be willing to sell an unlimited amount of asset 2
and buy twice that amount of asset 1 to earn an unlimited amount of money.
Notice here this opportunity can only exist when there are no constraints on
the individual’s freedom to trade.
1.2.4 Expected Utility (EU) Preferences
According to Expected Utility theory, individuals choose the portfolio that
maximises the sum of the von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function u of
portfolio payoff wj weighted by the probability of the corresponding state pj,
that is
U =
∑
j
u(wj)pj (1.14)
I assume that individuals are never satiated by money which means that the
first derivative of the utility function is positive u
′
> 0. One can measure
individuals’ attitudes to risk by two measures5:
5Generally the measure for a function’s concavity is the second derivative u
′′
, but
they are adjusted by u
′
because an EU utility function is unique only up to a linear
transformation.
9Absolute Risk Aversion Measure (ARA)
ARA(w) = −u(w)
′′
u(w)′
(1.15)
Relative Risk Aversion Measure (RRA)
RRA(w) = −wu(w)
′′
u(w)′
(1.16)
By assuming absolute risk aversion (1.15) and relative risk aversion (1.15) are
constant respectively, we can derive two special, and often used, functions -
belonging to the exponential utility family (Constant Absolute Risk Aversion
(CARA)) and to the power utility family (Constant Relative Risk Aversion
(CRRA)). I am going to assume these two kinds of functions in this portfolio
choice problem, and later will use the experimental data to test which one
is a better explanation of behaviour. Now I first present the problem using
the general Expected Utility model, and then derive the optimal allocation
for both the CARA and the CRRA utility functions.
Individuals who have Expected Utility preferences maximise the following
function
U =
∑
j∈{1,2,3}
pj × u(wj)
=
∑
j∈{1,2,3}
pj × u(c1 × d1j + c2 × d2j + e) (1.17)
The first order conditions are
dEU
dc1
=
∑
j∈{1,2,3}
pjd1ju
′(wj) = 0
dEU
dc2
=
∑
j∈{1,2,3}
pjd2ju
′(wj) = 0
10
Here we assume pj 6= 0, dij 6= 0, i ∈ {1, 2}, j ∈ {1, 2, 3}. Dividing the two
equations by the first element we get
1 +
p2d12
p1d11
u′(w2)
u′(w1)
+
p3d13
p1d11
u′(w3)
u′(w1)
= 0
1 +
p2d22
p1d21
u′(w2)
u′(w1)
+
p3d23
p1d21
u′(w3)
u′(w1)
= 0
Denote x and y as follows: 
x =
u′(w2)
u′(w1)
y =
u′(w3)
u′(w1)
(1.18)
Then we get 
1 +
p2d12
p1d11
x+
p3d13
p1d11
y = 0
1 +
p2d22
p1d21
x+
p3d23
p1d21
y = 0
or written in matrix form:
p2d12
p1d11
p3d13
p1d11
p2d22
p1d21
p3d23
p1d21
[x
y
]
=
[
−1
−1
]
The the first order condition for Expected Utility preferences becomes
[
x
y
]
=

p2d12
p1d11
p3d13
p1d11
p2d22
p1d21
p3d23
p1d21

−1 [
−1
−1
]
(1.19)
Condition for the Existence of an Optimal allocation with general
EU preferences First, from the first order condition (1.19), we know that
the matrix 
p2d12
p1d11
p3d13
p1d11
p2d22
p1d21
p3d23
p1d21

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should not be singular which means that
(
p2
p1
d12
d11
)(
p3
p1
d23
d21
)− (p3
p1
d13
d11
)(
p2
p1
d22
d21
) 6= 0.
Assume for ∀j ∈ {1, 2, 3} that pj 6= 0 and d11, d21 6= 0 , we get
d12d23 − d13d22 6= 0 (1.20)
If this condition does not hold, individuals would have an opportunity to
increase their utility unboundedly. The proof follows.
Proof If the condition is not satisfied then it implies
d12d23 − d13d22 = 0
which can be written as
d12
d22
=
d13
d23
= δ
Individuals could construct a portfolio in which c2 = −δc1 for which
w1 = d11c1 − δc1d21 + e = (d11 − δd21)c1 + e
w2 = d12c1 − δc1d22 + e = (d12 − δd22)c1 + e = e
w3 = d13c1 − δc1d23 + e = (d13 − δd23)c1 + e = e
Then the Expected Utility (1.17) becomes
U = p1u(w2) + p2u(w2) + p3u(w3)
= p1u((d11 − δc1d21)c1 + e) + p2u(e) + p3u(e)
Taking the first derivative of the utility function with respect to c1 we get
dU
dc1
= p1(d11 − δd21)u′(w1)
Then the Expected Utility is monotonically increasing/decreasing with re-
spect to c1. It is easy to understand since the portfolio payoffs for both state
2 and state 3 become constant by constructing such a portfolio. In this case:
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• d11 − δd21 > 0 then dU
dc1
> 0 and individuals would like to buy infinite
amount of asset 1 and sell δc1 of asset 2 to increase utility;
• d11 − δd21 < 0 then dU
dc1
< 0 and individuals would like to sell infinite
amount of asset 1 and buy δc1 of asset 2 to increase utility;
• d11 − δd21 = 0 then dU
dc1
= 0 and individuals are indifferent to any
allocation as long as c2 = −δc1
An example may help to illustrate this problem. Suppose that the return
table is
D =
[
0.1 −0.2 0.3
0.3 0.4 −0.6
]
We can calculate that δ = −0.2
0.4
= 0.3−0.6 = 0.5. Denoting by c2 = −δc1 =
0.5c1 and assuming that e = 100 then the Expected Utility becomes
U = p1u(w2) + p2u(w2) + p3u(w3)
= p1u(0.25c1 + 100) + p2u(100) + p3u(100)
The first derivative
dU
dc1
= 0.25p1u
′
(0.25c1 + 100) > 0
and so utility increases as c1 increases.
CARA utility function
Assume an individual who has constant absolute risk aversion and also assume
the following particular functional form6:
u(w) = −1
r
e−rw. (1.21)
6This function belongs to the exponential family. It assumes ARA is constant as
ARA(w) = −−wre
−rw−1
e−rw
= r
r > 0 represents risk-aversion and r < 0 represents risk-loving and r = 0 represents
risk-neutrality. The degree of risk aversion increases as r increases.
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Equation (1.18) becomes x = e−r×(w2−w1)y = e−r×(w3−w1).
Taking the logarithm of each side of the equation we getw2 − w1 = − lnxrw3 − w1 = − ln yr
Inserting these into equation (1.3) we getc1(d12 − d11) + c2 (d22 − d21) = − lnxrc1(d13 − d11) + c2 (d23 − d21) = − ln yr
and the matrix form is[
d12 − d11 d22 − d21
d13 − d11 d23 − d21
][
c1
c2
]
= −1
r
[
lnx
ln y
]
Then we get that the optimal allocation is[
c1
c2
]
= −1
r
[
d12 − d11 d22 − d21
d13 − d11 d23 − d21
]−1
ln
[
x
y
]
(1.22)
here x and y are calculated by the first order condition (1.19).
Conditions for the existence of an Optimal Allocation with a CARA
utility function First, as the logarithm is taken for x and y in equation
(1.22), both of them should be positive. By expanding the matrix form x
and y as defined in equation (1.19), we get
[
x
y
]
=

p1
p2
d13d21 − d23d11
d12d23 − d13d22
p1
p3
d11d22 − d12d21
d12d23 − d13d22

14
As we assume that for ∀j ∈ {1, 2, 3} that pj 6= 0, the first conditions are
the following: 
d13d21 − d23d11
d12d23 − d13d22 > 0
d11d22 − d12d21
d12d23 − d13d22 > 0
(1.23)
Second, as the inverse of the matrix[
d12 − d11 d22 − d21
d13 − d11 d23 − d21
]
needs to be taken, it cannot be singular. So we get a further condition:
(d12 − d11)(d23 − d21)− (d13 − d11)(d22 − d21) 6= 0 (1.24)
CRRA utility function
Assume an individual who has constant relative risk aversion and also assume
the following particular functional form7:
u(w) =
w
1−r
1−r , r 6= 1
ln(w) r = 1
(1.25)
Then equation (1.18) becomesx = (
w2
w1
)−r
y = (w3
w1
)−r
7The function belongs to the power family. It assumes RRA is constant as
RRA(w) = −−wrw
−r−1
w−r
= r
r > 0 represents risk aversion, r < 0 represents risk loving and r = 0 represents risk
neutrality. The degree of risk aversion increases as r increases.
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from which it follows that 
w2
w1
= x−
1
r
w3
w1
= y−
1
r
Inserting these into equation (1.3) we get
c1d12 + c2d22 + e
c1d11 + c2d21 + e
= x−
1
r
c1d13 + c2d23 + e
c1d11 + c2d21 + e
= y−
1
r
which also can be written as(d12 − x−
1
r d11)c1 + (d22 − x− 1r d21)c2 + (1− x− 1r )e = 0
(d13 − y− 1r d11)c1 + (d23 − y− 1r d21)c2 + (1− y− 1r )e = 0
and the matrix form is[
d12 − x− 1r d11 d22 − x− 1r d21
d13 − y− 1r d11 d23 − y− 1r d21
][
c1
c2
]
= e
[
x−
1
r − 1
y−
1
r − 1
]
Then we get the optimal allocation as[
c1
c2
]
= e
[
d12 − x− 1r d11 d22 − x− 1r d21
d13 − y− 1r d11 d23 − y− 1r d21
]−1 [
x−
1
r − 1
y−
1
r − 1
]
(1.26)
here x and y are derived through the first order conditions (1.19).
Conditions for the existence of an Optimal Allocation using the
CRRA utility function In equation (1.26), we have assumed the exis-
tence of the inverse of the matrix on the right hand side. Denoting by ||..||
the determinant of a matrix we get∥∥∥∥∥d12 − x−
1
r d11 d22 − x− 1r d21
d13 − y− 1r d11 d23 − y− 1r d21
∥∥∥∥∥ 6= 0
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which leads us to the condition
[
d21d13 − d11d23 d11d22 − d21d12
] [x− 1r
y−
1
r
]
6= d13d22 − d12d23 (1.27)
By the definition of x, y in equation (1.18), they are related to the probabil-
ities. Unlike the case in CARA utility function, the condition (1.27) is also
related to probabilities since x, y are related to the probabilities as they are
calculated by the first order conditions (1.19).
1.2.5 Conclusion
In this section, we have derived the explicit solution to the optimal portfolio
choice problem in an unconstrained setting for EU preferences ( specifically
for the CARA utility function, which is in equation (1.22), and the CRRA
utility function, which is in equation (1.26) and for Mean-Variance prefer-
ences, which is in equation (1.12). We also have discussed the conditions for
the existence of the corresponding solutions.
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1.3 Constrained Portfolio Choice problem in
the context of risk
1.3.1 Introduction
In the preceding section we studied the portfolio choice problem when in-
dividuals are free to buy or sell the assets without constraints. However in
the real world, individuals are always subject to different levels of constraints
as the supplies of the assets are not unlimited and also the trading volumes
are usually restricted for regulation reasons. Also in the experiment, it is
difficult to implement an environment in which subjects are free to buy/sell
any amount. If they were free to do so, then it is possible that they would
end up with negative cash. But we can not actually ask the subjects to pay
the experimenter money. So there has to be some constraints about trading.
In this section, we are going to study the portfolio choice problem with
constraints. Specifically, the constraint is set as 0 because the technical
details are the same for any other values. It means that individuals cannot
sell a particular amount of one asset when they actually do not hold enough
of that asset. Moreover as individuals are endowed only with cash at the start
of a problem, the constraints mean that they can not borrow money and also
they can not sell any risky assets. Then the No-short-selling constraints for
the allocation C = [c1 c2] can be written as
c1 ≥ 0
c2 ≥ 0
c1 + c2 ≤ e.
(1.28)
Here we define C as the complete set of C that satisfy equation (1.28). We
also call the area which all allocations satisfy the No-short-selling constraints
as the Allocation Triangle. In the preceding section we derived the analytical
solution for the unconstrained optimal allocation C∗, so we can now use that
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in what follows. When 
c∗1 ≥ 0
c∗2 ≥ 0
c∗1 + c
∗
2 ≤ e.
we have C∗ ∈ C so C∗ is also the constrained optimal allocation, which
denote by C∗∗. When c∗1 ≥ 0c∗2 < 0
and c∗2 ≥ 0c∗1 < 0
and 
c∗1 ≥ 0
c∗2 ≥ 0
c∗1 + c
∗
2 > e
and c∗1 < 0c∗2 < 0
we have C∗ /∈ C so C∗ is not the constrained optimal allocation. Denoting
by C∗∗ the constrained optimal allocation, I show now how to find the C∗∗
corresponding to these 5 scenarios. In each area, there are various ways of
finding C∗∗. Figure 1.1 to Figure 1.13 on Pages 22- 28 are illustration of the
various cases for each area. In these figures, the horizontal axis represents
c1 and the vertical axis represents c2. The contours are the indifference
curves of utility, which are plotted, for illustration, using the utility function
of Mean-Variance Preferences 8. Notice that the area within (including the
margins) the triangle represents all the allocations satisfying the No-short-
selling constraints (1.28). There are 3 special allocations involved in this
8These figures also could represent the case for the Expected Utility Preferences as the
utility functions for these are concave too.
19
analysis. Let me define them first. Denote by
1C∗ = [1c∗1 0]
as the unconstrained optimal allocation with the constraint that c2 = 0.
Denote by
2C∗ = [0 2c∗2]
as the unconstrained optimal allocation with the constraint that c1 = 0.
Denote by
0C∗ = [0c∗1
0c∗2]
as the unconstrained optimal allocation with the constraint that c1 + c2 = e.
• Area 0 (A0): c∗1 ≥ 0 and c∗2 ≥ 0 and c∗1 + c∗2 ≤ e
As shown in Figure 1.1 on Page 22, C∗ lies in the constrained area A0.
So the unconstrained optimal allocation is also the constrained optimal
allocation, we have C∗∗ = C∗.
• Area 1 (A1): c∗1 ≥ 0 and c∗2 < 0
As c∗2 < 0, C
∗ is not within A0. Then a reasonable guess is C∗∗ =1 C∗
as the latter is the tangency point of the indifference curves to the axis
c2 = 0. But we need to look through the following 3 cases.
– Case 1: As shown in Figure 1.2 on Page 22, 0 <1 c∗1 < e. So
1C∗ is a valid allocation. We have C∗∗ = C∗1
– Case 2: As shown in Figure 1.3 on Page 23, 1c∗1 > e. So
1C∗ is
not a valid allocation. Then the optimal allocation is the point
[e 0], where is the nearest indifference touches A0. So we have
C∗∗ = [e 0]
– Case 3: As shown in Figure 1.4 on Page 23, 1c∗1 < 0. Again
1C∗
is not a valid allocation. Then the optimal allocation is the point
[0 0], where is the nearest indifference touches A0. So we have
C∗∗ = [0 0]
• Area 2 (A2): c∗2 ≥ 0 and c∗1 < 0
20
C∗ is not a valid allocation. Being similar with the scenarios when it
is in A1, there are also 3 cases as follows:
– Case 1: As shown in Figure 1.5 on Page 24, 2C∗ is a valid allo-
cation. So we have C∗∗ =2 C∗
– Case 2: As shown in Figure 1.6 on Page 24, we have C∗∗ = [e 0]
– Case 3: As showing in Figure 1.7 on Page 25, we have C∗∗ =
[0 0]
• Area 3 (A3): c∗1 ≥ 0 and c∗2 ≥ 0 and c∗1 + c∗2 > e
C∗ is not a valid allocation as c∗1 + c
∗
2 > e. The position of C
∗∗
depends on 3 different locations of 0C∗, where the indifference curves
are tangential to the line c1 + c2 = e.
– Case 1: As shown in Figure 1.8 on Page 25, 0C∗ is a valid alloca-
tion because that 0c∗1 ≥ 0 and 0c∗2 ≥ 0. So we have C∗∗ =0 C∗.
– Case 2: As shown in Figure 1.9 on Page 26, 0c∗2 < 0.
0C∗ is not
a valid allocation, so we have C∗∗ = [e 0]
– Case 3: As shown in Figure 1.10 on Page 26, 0c∗1 < 0.
0C∗ is not
a valid allocation, so we have C∗∗ = [0 e] Notice that we do not
need to consider the case when both 0c∗1 < e and
0c∗2 < e since
it is implicitly excluded by the condition 0c∗1 +
0 c∗2 = e
• Area 4 (A4): c∗1 < and c∗2 < 0 This is a rather interesting scenario.
We expected C∗∗ = [0 0] but it turns out that it is not always correct.
Here still are 3 cases for C∗∗.
– Case 1: As shown in Figure 1.11 on Page 27, neither 0C∗1 or
0C∗2
is valid allocation. We have C∗∗ = [0 0] as expected.
– Case 2: As shown in Figure 1.12 on Page 27, 1c∗1 > 0 and
2c∗2 < 0.
So we have C∗∗ = [1c∗1 0].
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– Case 3: As shown in Figure 1.13 on Page 28, 1c∗1 < 0 and
2c∗2 > 0.
So we have C∗∗ = [0 2c∗2].
9
We have not considered the case in which both 1c∗1 > 0 and
2c∗2 >
0 because it is not possible. The proof is following. Assume that
1c∗1 > 0 and
1c∗2 > 0 and U(
1c∗1, 0) ≤ U(0,2 c∗2) . As C∗ = [c∗1 c∗2]
is the unconstrained optimal allocation, we have
U([1c∗1 0]) ≤ U([0 2c∗2] < U([c∗1 c∗2])
By the concavity of utility function, there exists a variable λ ∈
[0 1] that makes
[0 0c∗2] = λ[
1c∗1 0] + (1− λ)[c∗1 c∗2]
which implies that
2c∗2 = (1− λ) c∗2 ≤ 0
This is a contradiction with 2c∗2 > 0.
9If 1c∗1 < 0, we let C
∗∗ = [0 0] and if 1c∗1 > e, we let C
∗∗ = [e 0]. Similar technique
is applied to 2c∗2. Note the constrained optima is relatively simple in the case that there
is only dimension. That is there is only one variable. Denote by c the one variable and by
c∗ the unconstrained optima. Then the constrained optimal
c∗∗ =

0 c∗ < 0
c∗ 0 ≤ c∗ ≤ e
e c∗ > e.
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C∗/C∗∗
c1
c2
(0,0) (e, 0)
(0,e)
A0
A1
A2 A3
A3
Figure 1.1: A0
[c]
C∗
1C∗/C∗∗
c1
c2
(0,0) (e,0)
(0,e)
A0
A1
Figure 1.2: A1( Case 1)
23
C∗
C∗∗ 1C∗
c1
c2
(0,0) (e,0)
(0,e)
A0
A1
Figure 1.3: A1( Case 2)
C∗
C∗∗
1C∗
c1
(0,0) (e,0)
(0,e)
A0
A1
Figure 1.4: A1( Case 3)
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C∗
2C∗/C∗∗
c1
c2
(0,0) (e,0)
(0,e)
A0
A2
Figure 1.5: A2( Case 1)
C∗
← C∗∗
←
2 C∗
c1
c2
(0,0) (e,0)
(0,e)
A0
A2
Figure 1.6: A2( Case 2)
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C∗
C∗∗
←
2 C∗ c1
c2
(0,0) (e,0)
(0,e)
A0
A2
Figure 1.7: A2( Case 3)
C∗
0C∗/C∗∗
c1
c2
(0,0) (e,0)
(0,e)
A0
A3
Figure 1.8: A3( Case 1)
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C∗
C∗∗
0C∗
c1
c2
(0,0) (e,0)
(0,e)
A0
A3
Figure 1.9: A3( Case 2)
C∗
C∗∗
0C∗
c1
c2
(0,0) (e,0)
(0,e)
A0
A3
Figure 1.10: A3( Case 3)
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C∗
C∗∗
1C∗
2C∗
c1
c2
(0,0) (e, 0)
(0,e)
A0
A4
Figure 1.11: A4( Case 1)
C∗
1C∗/C∗∗
2C∗
c1
c2
(0,0)
A0
A4
Figure 1.12: A4( Case 2)
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C∗
2C∗/C∗∗
1C∗
c1
c2
(0,0)
A0
A4
Figure 1.13: A4( Case 3)
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1.3.2 Algorithm for the Constrained Optimal allocation
We have already described the various cases for the position of C∗∗ in all
the 5 areas. What we can do is to calculate C∗ first and then check which
area it is in. And then go through all the cases in that area. This method is
straightforward but tedious and time-consuming. So we are going to adopt
an alternative algorithm which is as follows. As analysed before, no matter
which area C∗∗ is in, there are only 7 different values that C∗∗ can be
assigned. They are C∗, 1C∗, 2C∗, 0C∗, [0 e], [e 0] and [0 0] and
are denoted as C0, C1, C2, C3, C4, C5 and C6 respectively. These 7
allocations cover all possible values that C∗∗ could take. So we can calculate
all of them and also the corresponding maximised utilities first. Then we
can compare these maximised utilities and find the maximum one. The
maximum utility of all maximised utilities is the constrained maximised utility
and the corresponding optimal allocation is C∗∗, the constrained optimal
allocation. Notice that for Ck k ∈ {1, 2, 3}, they could be invalid if they
do not satisfy the No-short-selling constraints (1.28). In such scenarios,
we specify the corresponding maximised utility to −Inf to make sure they
are not chosen. The details of the algorithm are in Algorithm 1 on Page
30. Algorithm 1 is a general approach for finding the constrained optimal
allocation for different preferences. It needs us to provide the expression of
Ck k ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6}, which are relevant to the objective functions.
Next I provide these solutions and explain how to apply Algorithm 1 to MV
preferences and EU preferences.
1.3.3 Constrained Optimal Allocation for MV Prefer-
ences
The objective function for Mean-Variance Preferences is function (1.10
U = e+Cµ− 1
2
rCΩC
′
. (1.29)
here µ and Ω are defined in equation (1.5) and (1.7) respectively.
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Algorithm 1: Constrained Optimal allocation
Input : r, p1, p2, p3, e
Output: C∗
Calculate C∗ using explicit solution ;
if C∗ ∈ C then
C∗∗=C0; U∗∗=U(C0);
else
U˜0 = −Inf ;
end
for k = 1 to 6 do
Calculate Ck;
if Ck ∈ C then
Uk=U(Ck);
else
U˜k = −Inf ;
end
end
Then we have
C∗∗ =
{
C0 if C0 is valid
Ck if for k there is Uk = max{U1, U2, U3, U4, U5, U6}
Step 1 As derived in equation (1.12), the unconstrained optimal allocation
is
C∗ =
1
r
(Ω−1µ)
′
. (1.30)
We then check that whether C∗ ∈ C, that is, if it satisfes equation (1.28).
If not we then proceed to step 2.
Step 2
• For calculating 1C∗, let c2 = 0 so the objective function becomes
U = e+Cµ− 1
2
rCΩC
′
= e+ c1µ1 − 1
2
rc21σ
2
1
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Using the first order condition, the optimal allocation is
c∗1 =
µ1
σ21r
.
The corresponding maximised utility is
U([c∗1, 0]) = e+
1
2
µ21
σ21r
.
Then we have
C1 =
[
µ1
σ21r
0
]
and
U1 =
e+
1
2
µ21
σ21r
if 0 ≤ µ1
σ21r
≤ e
−Inf if µ1
σ21r
< 0 or > e
• By the symmetry of c1 and c2 we have
C2 =
[
µ2
σ22r
0
]
and
U2 =

e+
1
2
µ22
σ22r
if 0 ≤ µ2
σ22r
≤ e
−Inf if µ2
σ22r
< 0 or > e
• For calculating 0C∗ we impose the constraint that c1 + c2 = e to
maximise the function ((1.10)). It becomes an equality constrained
optimisation problem and we can write the Lagrangian function as
L = U − λ(c1 + c2 − e)
= e+ (c1µ1 + c2µ2)− 1
2
r(c21σ
2
1 + c
2
2σ
2
2 + c1c2σ12)− λ(c1 + c2 − e)
and the first order condition is
Lc1 = µ1 − r(c1σ21 + c2σ12)− λ
Lc1 = µ2 − r(c2σ22 + c1σ12)− λ
Lλ = c1 + c2 − e = 0.
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Then we have that µ1 − r(c1σ21 + c2σ12) = µ2 − r(c2σ22 + c1σ12) and
also c1 +c2−e = 0. By solving these two equations we get the solution
as
C3 =
[
c∗1 c
∗
2
]
here we have that
c∗1 =
µ1 − µ2 − r(σ12e+ erσ22
rσ12 − 2σ12 + σ22)
c∗2 =
−µ1 + rσ12e+ µ2 − rσ12e
r(σ12 − 2σ12 + σ22) .
The corresponding maximum is
U3 = e+ C3µ− 1
2
rC3ΩC
′
3.
Step 3 This step does not involve a check as to whether any result satisfies
the constraints, so we can directly get:
• C4 = [e 0] and U4 = U([100 0]) = e+ eµ1 − 12re2σ21
• C5 = [0 e] and U5 = U([0 100]) = e+ eµ2 − 12re2σ21
• C6 = [0 0] and U6 = U([0 0]) = e
1.3.4 Constrained Optimal Allocation for EU Prefer-
ences
CARA utility function
For an individual who has Expected Utility Preferences and has a CARA
utility function, the objective function is
EU = −
∑
j∈[1,2,3]
pj
1
r
e−r(c1d1j+c2d2j+e).
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Step 1: Calculating C0 The unconstrained optimal allocationC∗ is stated
in equation (1.22). We then check that if C∗ satisfies the equation (1.28).
If not we then proceed to the step 2.
Step 2: Calculating C1,C2,C3
• C1 In this case, c2 = 0 so the objective function
EU = −
∑
j∈[1,2,3]
pj
1
r
e−r(c1d1j+e).
The first order condition is
dEU
c1
= p1d11e
−rc1d11 + p2d12e−rc1d12 + p3d13e−rc1d13 = 0. (1.31)
There is not an explicit solution for this equation but the optimum can
be found numerically. 10.Denoting by 1c∗1 the answer then
C1 = [
1c∗1 0]
and the corresponding maximum is
U1 =
−
∑
j pj
1
r
e−r(
1c∗1d1j+e) if 0 ≤1 c∗1 ≤ e
−Inf if 1c∗1 < 0 or > e
• C2 By symmetry we have
C2 = [
1c∗2 0]
here 1c∗2 is the numerical solution to the equation
dEU
c2
= p1d21e
−rc2d11 + p2d22e−rc2d12 + p3d23e−rc1d23 = 0. (1.32)
10Most mathematical software can solve an equation of this form. In matlab, fzero can
calculate the solution for an equation in a defined area.
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The corresponding maximised utility is
U2 =
−
∑j 1
r
e−r(
2c∗2d1j+e) if 0 ≤2 c∗2 ≤ e
−Inf if 2c∗2 < 0 or > e
• C3 This is an equality constrained optimisation problem which could
be resolved by the Lagrangian method. But since there are only two
variables here it might be easier just replace c2 = e−c2 in the objective
function; then it becomes
EU = −
j∑
j∈[1,2,3]
pj
1
r
e−r(c1(d1j−d2j)+ed2j+e).
The first order condition is
dEU
c1
=
j∑
pj(d1j − d2j)e−r(c1(d1j−d2j) = 0.
There is also no explicit solution for this equation but the optimum
can be found numerically. Denoting by 0c∗1 the answer then
C3 = [
0c∗1 e−0 c∗1]
and the corresponding maximum is
U3 =
−
∑j pj 1re−r(0c∗1(d1j−d2j)+ed2j+e) if e ≥0 c∗1 ≥ 0
−Inf if 2c∗2 < 0 or > e
Step 3 This step does not involve a check as to whether any result satisfies
the constraints, so we can directly get:
• C4 = [e 0] and U4 = U([100 0]) = −
∑
j pj
1
r
e−r(ed1j+e)
• C5 = [0 e] and U5 = U([0 100]) = −
∑
j pj
1
r
e−r(ed2j+e)
• C6 = [0 0] and U6 = U([0 0]) = −
∑
j pj
1
r
e−re
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CRRA utility function
For an individual who has Expected Utility Preferences and also has a CRRA
utility function, the objective function is
EU =
j∑
j∈[1,2,3]
(c1d1j + c2d2j + e)
r
Step 1: Calculating C0 The expression for the unconstrained optimal
allocation C is equation (1.26). We then check that if C∗ ∈ C. If not we
then proceed to the step 2.
Step 2: Calculating C1, C2, C3
• C1 In this case, c2 = 0 so the objective function becomes
EU =
∑
j∈[1,2,3]
pj(c1d1j + e)
r
The first order condition is
dEU
c1
= p1d11(c1d11+e)
r−1+p2d12(c1d12+e)r−1+p3d13)(c1d13+e)r−1 = 0.
There is no explicit solution for this equation but the optimum can be
found numerically.Denoting by 1c∗1 the answer then
C1 = [
1c∗1 0]
and the corresponding maximum is
U1 =

∑
j pj(
1c∗1d1j + e)
r if e ≥1 c∗1 ≥ 0
−Inf if 1c∗1 < 0 or > e
• C2 By symmetry we have
C2 = [0
1c∗2]
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here 2c∗2 is the numerical solution to the equation
dEU
c2
= p1d21(c1d21+e)
r−1+p2d22(c1d22+e)r−1+p3d23)(c1d23+e)r−1 = 0.
(1.33)
The corresponding maximised utility is
U2 =

∑j pj(2c∗2d2j + e)r if 0 ≤2 c∗2 ≤ e
−Inf if 2c∗2 < 0 or > e
• C3 This is an equality constrained optimisation problem which could
be resolved by the Lagrangian method. But since there are only two
variables here it might be easier just to replace c2 = e − c2 in the
objective function; then it becomes
EU = −
j∑
j∈[1,2,3]
pj(c1(d1j − d2j) + ed2j + e)r
The first order condition is
dEU
c1
=
j∑
pj(d1j − d2j)(c1(d1j − d2j) + ed2j + e)r−1 = 0.
There is also no explicit solution for this equation but the optimum can
be found numerically. Denote 0c∗1 as the calculated optimal allocation.
C3 = [
0c∗1 e−0 c∗1]
and the corresponding maximum is
U3 =
−
∑j
j∈[1,2,3] pj(
0c∗1(d1j − d2j) + ed2j + e)r if e ≥0 c∗1 ≥ 0
−Inf if 0c∗1 < 0 or > e
Step 3 This step does not involve a check as to whether any result satisfies
the constraints, so we can directly get:
• C4 = [e 0] and U4 = U([100 0]) = −
∑j pj(ed1j + e)r
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• C5 = [0 e] and U5 = U([0 100]) = −
∑j pj(ed2j + e)r
• C6 = [0 0] and U6 = U([0 0]) = er
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1.4 Portfolio Choices in the context of ambi-
guity
1.4.1 Introduction
I begin by applying the Maxmin Expected Utility (MEU) model to our port-
folio choice problem. I provide two algorithms to find the MEU optimal
allocation with the No-short-selling constraints. The first algorithm is purely
numerical, but it takes a lot of time, and does not provide reliable solutions.
The second algorithm is much more efficient but there is a lot of analy-
sis to prove the validity of the algorithm. We are going to use the second
algorithm for estimation when we fit this model to the experimental data.
Then I introduce α-Maxmin Expected Utility (α-MEU) preferences, which is
a generalisation of MEU. I also provide an algorithm to calculate the optimal
allocation based on the previous analysis for MEU. The reader should be
warned that there is a lot of technical detail in this section - concerning the
derivation and application of algorithms to find the optimal portfolio alloca-
tions in the context of ambiguity. As is always the case, there is a trade-off
between elegance and efficiency. While it would be nice to be able to find
explicit analytical solutions to the determination of the optimal allocation,
often, particularly when there are constraints on the allocation, explicit so-
lutions cannot be obtained. In these cases we need to develop algorithms
to find the solutions. Once again there is a trade-off between elegance and
efficiency: it is not always the case that the most elegant algorithms are the
computationally most efficient. One problem is that it is natural to explore
the explicit route as far as possible before moving to computationally more ef-
ficient ones, though the latter in turn are driven by analytical considerations.
The reader should try and keep this in mind throughout this section.
1.4.2 Maxmin Expected Utility (MEU) Preferences
Expected Utility theory assumes that individuals act as if they are maximis-
ing the probability weighted utilities over all the states. It assumes there is
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only one prior, that is individuals believe that the probability of each state
is fixed. While in the MEU theory, it is assumed that there are multiple
priors. Individuals are unware about the actual probabilities but believe that
they lie in a set of possible probabilities. For each possible allocation, in-
dividuals work out the expected utility using the set of priors and consider
the minimum expected utility as the utility of this allocation. By applying
the same procedure to all the possible allocations, individuals then choose
the allocation which produces the maximised utility. Notice that the major
difference here is, whereas in the EU preference, the utility obtained from an
allocation is just the expected utility, but in the MEU preferences, the utility
over an allocation is the minimum expected utility among all the priors.
Denoting by P the set of all possible priors, and C as the set of all possible
allocations, then the objective function of MEU model can be written as
U = max
C∈C
min
P∈P
{pj
∑
j∈(1,2,3)
u(wj)} (1.34)
here wj is the payoff from allocation. In Figure 1.14, the horizontal axis
p1
p3
p
3
p
1
p
2
P1P2
P3
0 1
1
Figure 1.14: Marschk-Machina Triangle
represents p1 and the vertical axis represents p3 and we must have 0 ≤
p1, p3 ≤ 1 as the sum of probabilities is equal to 1. This constraint makes
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a triangle area called the Marschak-Machina Triangle (MMT) and any point
inside the triangle represents a probability vector for a three states gamble.
The MEU preferences model does not tell us how the individuals specify P,
which is the set of possible priors. We are going to characterise this set in
the following way. We are going to assume that for all individuals believe
there is a probability lower bound pj for each state j:
pj ≥ pj forj = 1, 2, 3
There is p
1
+ p
2
+ p
3
≤ 1. The small triangle 11 inside the MMT then
represents the set P.
Basically when we are finding the MEU optimal allocation, there are two
steps involved. The first step is to calculate the minimum expected utility
in terms of all the elements P ∈ P for each allocation C ∈ C. We call this
step Min-EU. The second step is to repeat the first step for all the C ∈ C
to find C∗ which produces the maximized minimum expected utility. We call
this step Max-Min-EU. With the No-short-selling constraints (1.28), C is the
Allocation Triangle. Assume K and H as the size (the number of elements)
of C and P respectively. 12
Take a very simple example by assuming that individuals have an endowment
of 3 units of cash and can only allocate integer amounts. Then K = 10 as
all the possible allocations are [0 0], [0 1], [0 2], [0 3], [1 0], [1 1], [1 2], [2 0],
[2 1], [3 0]. Algorithm 2 on Page 41 provides a straightforward way to find
the optimal allocation for MEU utility preferences (1.34).
11Another possible way to specify P is assuming it is a circle area inside MMT. The
center of the circle is a subjective prior and the radius is also a subjective parameter. But
it assumes symmetry for the three states. We think it is more flexible to use the lower
bound assumption.
12Theoretically the numbers of elements of C and P infinity. But if we let computer to
this computation continuously, it usually calculates using a small precision, so K and H
can be very large.
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Algorithm 2: Pure numerical method to find MEU optimal allocation
Input : r, p1, p2, p3, e
Output: C∗
// The loop below is for step Max-Min-EU. We repeat K times
to find the Maxmin EU in C, which is the set of all
allocations
for k = 1 to K do
// The loop below is for step Min-EU. For each Ck we
repeat H times to find the minimum EU in P, which is
the set of all priors
for h = 1 to H do
EUh = U(Ck, Ph) ; // calculate eu
end
EUH = {EUh|h ∈ [1, H]};
EUk = min{EU}; // find the Min eu
end
EUK = {EUk|k ∈ [1, K]};
C∗ = {Ck|EUK = max{EUK}; // find the Max-Min eu
1.4.3 Algorithm with analytic results to find the optimal
allocation with MEU preferences
Notice that in Algorithm 2, we need to calculate the utility H∗K times. This
takes an a lot of time, especially when H and K are big. And the results are
not reliable when using most in-built optimisation functions in mathematical
software; since those optimisation functions are built on first and second order
conditions. It requires the function to be smooth in the specified optimisation
area. But our objective function (1.34) is a kinked function. If the optimal
allocation happens to be at the kink, those optimisation routines may not be
able to find it. That is why we have developed the following algorithm. We
have tested it against the purely numerical algorithm and the former always
returns the optimal allocation while the later fails (usually when the optimal
allocation is at the kink).
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A Complicated but Reliable and Efficient Algorithm
First, for any arbitrary allocation C and a given return table D there is a
corresponding portfolio payoff vector W = [w1 w2 w3]
′
, where W = CD
is the product of the two matrices13. The j-th element of W represents the
portfolio payoff in state j, j = 1, 2, 3. If Minimum Portfolio Payoff (MinPP)
wj = min{W}, then u(wj) = min{u(w1), u(w2), u(w3)} since utility func-
tion u is assumed to be monotonically increasing with respect to the out-
come w. By assigning the maximum probability (1 minus the probabilities
lower bounds of the other two states) to MinPP state j and the minimum
probabilities (the probability lower bounds) to the other two states, we get
the minimum expected utility. The corresponding probability vectors for the
portfolio payoff to be then MinPP at state 1,2 and 3 are P1, P3 and P3
respectively. They are defined by equation (1.35) and also illustrated in Fig-
ure 1.14 on Page 39. As they are the 3 corners of the MMT, we call them
corner probabilities.

P1 = [1− p2 − p3, p2, p3]
′
;
P2 = [p1, 1− p1 − p3, p3]
′
;
P3 = [p1, p2, 1− p1 − p2]
′
;
(1.35)
Given any allocation C,
wj = min{W}14
is both necessary and sufficient for the follow equation to be true.
min
P∈P
 ∑
j∈(1,2,3)
pju(wj)
 = U(Pj,W) (1.36)
because the utility function u is monotonically increasing. Here u takes the
form of a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function and U(Pj,W) refers
to the expected utility given the probability vector Pj and the payoff vector
13C is a 1*2 matrix and D is a 2*3 matrix so we have W is a 1*3 vector.
14Notice here we define the term minimum as strictly minimum. For example, w1 =
min{W} means w1 < w2 and w1 < w3.
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Possibility subset MinPP state
1 C0 w1 = w2 = w3
2 L1 w2 = w3, w2 < w1, w3 < w1
3 L2 w3 = w1, w3 < w2, w1 < w2
4 L3 w1 = w2, w1 < w3, w2 < w3
5 A1 w1 < w2, w1 < w3
6 A2 w2 < w1, w2 < w3
7 A3 w3 < w1, w3 < w2
Table 1.1: The seven possibilities for MinPP
W. For example,
U(P1,W) = (1− p2 − p3)u(w1) + p2u(w2) + p3u(w3).
The formal proof for equation (1.36) is as follows We let Uˆ = (Pˆ,W) with
Pˆ = [pˆ1, pˆ2, pˆ3] to be any point in P − P1. Next we use U1 to refer to
U(P1,W).Then we have
Uˆ − U1 = [pˆ1u(w1) + pˆ2u(w2) + pˆ3u(w3)]
− [(1− p
2
− p
3
)u(w1) + p2u(w2) + p3u(w3)]
= [(1− pˆ2 − pˆ3)u(w1) + pˆ2u(w2) + pˆ3u(w3)]
− [(1− p
2
− p
3
)u(w1) + p2u(w2) + p3u(w3)]
= (pˆ2 − p2)[u(w2)− u(w1)] + (pˆ3 − p3)[u(w3)− u(w1)] > 0.
The last inequality follows from u(w2)−u(w1) > 0, u(w3)−u(w1) > 0 and
pˆ2 − p2 > 0, pˆ3 − p3 > 0. As we have proved that equation (1.36) is valid,
the MEU objective function (1.34) can be written as
U = max
C∈C
U(Pj,W) s.t. wj = min{W}, j ∈ {1, 2, 3} (1.37)
Notice there are 7 possibilities for wj = min{W}, j ∈ {1, 2, 3}. Table 1.1
lists all the 7 possibilities. As wj is calculated from the allocations, the 7
possibilities of MinPP actually imply 7 constraints on the allocations. Hence
we divide the Allocation Triangle C into 7 corresponding subsets according
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to the constraints as shown in Table 1.1. Next I demonstrate how to define
the subsets by imposing the constraints on the allocations. Figure 1.16 on
Page 57 demonstrates the 7 subsets visually as the different areas in the
Allocation Triangle. Notice that it is plotted with a particular return table so
it does not cover the generality of various possible positions for these subsets.
But at least it helps us to understand how do we divide these subsets. Next
we first point out their positions in the figure, then derive the mathematical
implications from the constraints.
Subset C0 This refers to the origin in Figure 1.16. For w1 = w2 = w3 we
have 
d12c1 + d22c2 + e = d13c1 + d23c2 + e when w2 = w3
d11c1 + d21c2 + e = d13c1 + d23c2 + e when w3 = w1
d11c1 + d21c2 + e = d12c1 + d22c2 + e when w1 = w2
Rearranging the equation system we get
c2 = s1c1 when w2 = w3
c2 = s2c1 when w3 = w1
c2 = s3c1 when w1 = w2
(1.38)
where s1, s2 and s3 are given by equation (1.39).
s1 = −d12 − d13
d22 − d23
s2 = −d11 − d13
d21 − d23
s3 = −d11 − d12
d21 − d22
(1.39)
As equation (1.38) implies s1c1 = s2c1 = s3c1 and we do not have s1 = s2 =
s3
15 then the solution for equation (1.38) is c1 = c2 = 0. So the subset
C0 = [0 0] refers to the origin in Figure ??.
15Please refer to equation (1.24)
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Subset Li, i ∈ {1, 2, 3} These refer to the three boundary lines inside
the triangle in Figure 1.16. Notice that one of them is a dashed line. We
will give the reason for that shortly. Without loss of generality, we adopt the
convention as shown in equation (1.40)
if i = 1 then j = 2 and k = 3
if i = 2 then j = 3 and k = 1
if i = 3 then j = 1 and k = 2
(1.40)
For Li, the equality constraint is wj = wk and the inequality constraints are
wj < wi and wk < wi. For wj = wk, the corresponding constraint is
c2 = sic1 (1.41)
where si is its slope and is defined in equation (1.42)
si = −d1j − d1k
d2j − d2k i ∈ {1, 2, 3} (1.42)
For wj < wi, we have
d1jc1 + d2jc2 < d1ic1 + d2ic2
(d1j − d1i)c1 < −(d2j − d2i)c2
The solution is c2 > skc1 if d2i > d2jc2 < skc1 if d2i < d2j (1.43)
Similarly the solution constraint is for wk < wi, we havec2 > sjc1 if d2i > d2kc2 < sjc1 if d2i < d2k (1.44)
As shown in the derivation, the different relations between d2i, d2j make the
definition of the subsets Li and Ai complicated while giving us very little
insight. So we re-order the return table such that d21 < d22 < d23 which can
always be done without loss of generality. For example, consider a return
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table
D =
[
−0.4 −0.1 0.7
2.1 −0.9 −1
]
(1.45)
Since the order of the states does not influence the decisions we can write
D as
D =
[
0.7 −0.1 −0.4
−1 −0.9 2.1
]
(1.46)
With the convention (1.40), the inequality constraints wj < wi and wk < wi
for Li become 
c2 < s3c1, c2 < s2c1 if i = 1
c2 < s1c1, c2 > s3c1 if i = 2
c2 > s2c1, c2 > s1c1 if i = 3
So in conclusion we have
L1 = {C ∈ C |c2 = s1c1, c2 < min{s2, s3}c1}
L2 = {C ∈ C |c2 = s2c1, s3c1 < c2 < s1c1}
L3 = {C ∈ C |c2 = s3c1, c2 > max{s1, s2}c1}
(1.47)
We can further explore equation (1.47) by listing all possible orderings for
s1, s2 and s3. Denote the ordering as follows
I : s1 < s2 < s3
II : s1 < s3 < s2
III : s2 < s1 < s3
IV : s2 < s3 < s1
V : s3 < s1 < s2
V I : s3 < s2 < s1
Notice that the Allocation Triangle is in the positive quadrant. So it means
that if the slope si is negative then there is no intersection of the line c2 =
s1c1 with the Allocation Triangle. In this case, we have Li = ∅ for sure. For
the time being we assume that all si > 0. Take order I for example. First
consider L1. As s2 < s3 implies min{s2, s3} = s2 we have L1 = {C ∈
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C |c2 = s1c1, c2 < s2c1}. As s1 < s2, the line c2 = s1c1 is inside the area
c2 < s2c1, we then have L1 = {C ∈ C |c2 = s1c1}. There is part of the line
c2 = s1c1 inside the Allocation Triangle. Denote I as the intersection point
of it with the line c1 + c2 = e. By solving the equations systemc1 + c2 = ec2 = s1c1
we have
I = [
e
1 + s1
,
es1
1 + s1
]
So we have
L1 = {c2 = s1c1, 0 ≤ c1 ≤ e
1 + s1
}
Now consider L2. As s3 > s1 it implies that s3c1 < c2 < s1c1 = ∅ so we
have L2 = ∅. The analysis for L3 is quite similar for L1, we get
L3 = {c2 = s3c1, 0 ≤ c1 ≤ e
1 + s3
}
Mutatis mutandis, we can define Li in Table 1.2 for all 6 orderings.
∀i ∈ {1, 2, 3}, Li = ∅ if si < 0
Ordering L1 L2 L3
I
c2 = s1c1
0 ≤ c1 ≤ e1+s1
∅ c2 = s3c1
0 ≤ c1 ≤ e1+s3
II
c2 = s1c1
0 ≤ c1 ≤ e1+s1
∅ ∅
III ∅ ∅ c2 = s3c1
0 ≤ c1 ≤ e1+s3
IV ∅ ∅ ∅
V ∅ ∅ ∅
V I ∅ c2 = s2c1
0 ≤ c1 ≤ e1+s2
∅
Table 1.2: Definition of Li, i ∈ {1, 2, 3}
Figure 1.15 demonstrates the 3 possible positions for each Li in the Allocation
Triangle.
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Figure 1.15: Boundary Lines
1. Position 1©
For this position, on the line c2 = sic1 there is wj = wk, which makes
is the equality constraint. And si > 0 so the line crosses C. The
inequality constraints wj < wi and wk < wi are also satisfied on it. So
Li is OI as shown in the figure. Here O is the original point of C.
2. Position 2©
For this position, it is similar to position 1 except that the inequality
constraints wj < wi and wk < wi are not satisfied so Li = ∅.
3. Position 3©
Here we have si < 0 the line does not cross C so Li = ∅.
Subset Ai, i ∈ {1, 2, 3} They refer to the triangle areas separated by Li
Figure 1.16. For Ai we have two inequality constraints wi < wj and wi < wk
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as wi = min{wi, wj, wk}. We have for Ai
c2 > skc1, c2 > sjc1 if d2i < d2j and d2i < d2k
c2 < skc1, c2 > sjc1 if d2i > d2j and d2i < d2k
c2 > skc1, c2 < sjc1 if d2i < d2j and d2i > d2k
c2 < skc1, c2 < sjc1 if d2i > d2j and d2i > d2k
(1.48)
By re-ordering the return table such that d21 < d22 < d23 we have the
constraints to define the A1,A2 and A3 as
A1 = {C ∈ C | c2 > s3c1}
A2 =
{C ∈ C | s1c1 < c2 < s3c1} if s1 < s3∅ if s1 > s3
A3 = {C ∈ C|c2 < s1c1}
(1.49)
At this point we stop further discussion of the relation between s1 and s3
because it is unnecessary for developing the Algorithm to find the MEU
optimal allocation. As we will see next, we adopt a different strategy which
can be used to find the boundary lines and determine the area of the local
optimal allocations. Now I will discuss how to calculate the optimal allocation
for each subset in detail.
• Origin C0
For C0 = [0 0] the MEU objective function (1.37) becomes
U˜0 = max
C∈{[0, 0]}
min{U(P1), U(P2), U(P3)}
= min{u(e), u(e), u(e)}
= u(e) (1.50)
• Areas A1, A2 and A3
From equation (1.49) we know that A2 = ∅ when s1 > s3. So we can
always check this first, if s1 > s3 then we do not need to calculate
the local optimal allocation for A2. We can just let U˜∗2 = −Inf
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to let exclude this case. If s1 < s3, then we adopt the following
strategy. Ignoring the constraints for area Ai, i ∈ [1, 2, 3], the MEU
objective function becomes a normal Expected Utility function. So
we can get the optimal allocation C∗Ai and the corresponding local
maximised expected utility U∗Ai for the function U(Pi} by Algorithm 1.
Though Algorithm 1 guarantees that the local optimal allocations are
inside C, it does not guarantee that they satisfy their corresponding
constraints of their areas. If C∗Ai is outside the area of Ci, it means
it is not a valid local optimal allocation. Then the valid local optimal
allocation must lie on the boundary lines of area Ai, so will be captured
when calculating the local optimal allocation for the boundary lines.
Hence we can let U˜∗i = −Inf to exclude the possibility that the local
optimal allocation is the global optimal allocation in this case. In
conclusion we have
U˜∗Ai∈{1,2,3} =
UC∗Ai if C∗Ai ∈ Ai−Inf if C∗Ai /∈ Ai
• Boundary Lines L1, L2 and L3
In the Allocation Triangle, these subsets are actually the boundary lines
of the areas Ai, where there is a strictly minimum portfolio payoff.
According to Table (1.2), there are various cases for which Li = ∅.
We can calculate s1, s2, s3 first and then check if any such cases exist.
If so, then we let U˜Li = −Inf . When Li 6= ∅, the following procedure
is adopted. As we have wj = wk = min{w1, w2, w3}, the MEU
objective function for Li is
U˜Li = max
C∈Lj
U(Pj} = max
C∈Lk
U(Pk} (1.51)
But we cannot find the local optimal allocation here in the same way
as we have done for area Ai, that is ignoring the constraints to find
the optimal allocation first and then excluding the point it if it does
not satisfy the constraints. since a local optimal allocation lying on
the boundaries will be missed. As the constraints are incorporated in
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the process of finding the optimal allocation and they are implying
wj = wk, we can just calculate either max
C∈Lj
U(Pj} or max
C∈Lk
U(Pk}. As
shown in equation (1.47), there are various cases for which Li = ∅
depending on si. We will check them first. If Li = ∅ we let U˜Li =
−Inf . If not then we use the following strategy. As when Li 6= ∅
the constraints for Li are c2 = sici and 0 ≤ c1 ≤ e1+si . We denote
1Ci as the optimal allocation for the function U(Pj} with the equality
constraint c2 = sic1. Notice here we put a superscript on the left of
C to emphasize that we are solving for c1. We can find the optimal
allocation with the equality constraint and then modify it to satisfy
the inequality constraint. Next I will demonstrate how to get 1Ci for
two types of utility functions - CARA and CRRA, which are the two
functions used in this thesis.
CARA Assume individuals have the particular form of CARA utility
function defined in equation (1.21)
u(w) = −1
r
e−rw
Then the expected utility function is
U(wj) = −
∑
j
pj
1
r
e−rwj
By inserting the constraint that c2 = sic1, we get the first order con-
dition ∑
j
pj(d1j + sid2j)e
−r(d1jc1+d2jsic1+e) = 0 (1.52)
Denote c∗1 as the solution for equation (1.52). So we have
1C =
[c∗1 sic
∗
1].
CRRA Assume individuals have the particular form of CRRA utility
function defined in equation (1.25)
u(w) =
w1−r
1− r
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Then the expected utility function is
U(wj) =
∑
j
pj
w1−rj
1− r (1.53)
By inserting the constraint that c2 = sic1, we get the first order con-
dition is
∑
j
pj(d1j + sid2j)(d1jc1 + d2jsic1 + e)
−r = 0 (1.54)
Denote c∗1 as the solution for equation (1.54). So we have
1C =
[c∗1 sc
∗
1]. Notice that
1Ci = [c
∗
1 sic
∗
1] may not be inside C. Using
the constraints for Li in Table 1.2, we get that for Li, the optimal
allocation is
C∗Li =

C1 0 ≤ c∗1 ≤ e1+si
[0, 0] c∗1 < 0
[ e
1+si
, esi
1+si
] c∗1 >
e
1+si
(1.55)
and the corresponding maximized utility is U˜∗Li = U(C
∗
Li).
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We have discussed how to find the local optimal allocation for the various
situations in each the 7 subsets in C in detail. The global optimal allocation
C∗∗ is the one that generates the highest local utility. Based on the analy-
sis, Algorithm 3 shows how to find the MEU optimal allocation combining
numerical methods with analytical results.
Algorithm 3: Numerical method employing analytical results to find MEU
optimal allocation (Part 1)
Input : r, p1, p2, p3,D, e
Output: C∗
// Find si, i ∈ {1, 2, 3} according to equation (1.39)
s1 = −(d12 − d13)/(d22 − d23);
s2 = −(d11 − d13)/(d21 − d23);
s3 = −(d11 − d12)/(d21 − d22);
// Find the corner probabilities Pi, i ∈ {1, 2, 3} according to
equation (1.35)
P1 = [1− p2 − p3, p2, p3]′ ;
P2 = [p1, 1− p1 − p3, p3]′ ;
P3 = [p1, p2, 1− p1 − p2]′ ;
// Find CAi , i ∈ {1, 2, 3} according to equation (1.49)
for i = 1 to 3 do
[Ci, U˜i] = f1(U(Pi)) ; // Ci = CAi,U˜i = U˜Ai
// f1 refers to Algorithm 1
end
// Exclude the temporary local optimal allocation of Ai if
it is not in the area of Ai
for i = 1 to 3 do
W = CiD;
if W(i) 6= min{W} then
U˜i = −Inf
end
end
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Algorithm 3: Numerical method employing analytical results to find the
MEU optimal allocation (Part 2)
// Find CLi , i ∈ {1, 2, 3} according to equation (1.55)
// C4 = CL1 C5 = CL2 C6 = CL3
C4 = f2(U(P2)) // f2 refers to equation (1.55)
C5 = f2(U(P3));
C6 = f2(U(P1));
// U˜4 = U˜L1 U˜5 = U˜L2 U˜6 = U˜L3
U4 = U
∗(P2)) ;
U5 = U
∗(P3));
U6 = U
∗(P1));
// Exclude local optimal allocations according to Table
(1.2)
if s1 < s2 < s3 then
U˜5 = −Inf ;
else if s1 < s3 < s2 then
U˜5 = U˜6 = −Inf ;
else if s2 < s1 < s3 then
U˜4 = U˜5 = −Inf ;
else if s2 < s3 < s1 or s3 < s1 < s2 then
U˜4 = U˜5 = U˜6 = −Inf ;
else
U˜5 = −Inf ;
end
for i = 4 to 6 do
if si−3 < 0 then
U˜i = −Inf ;
end
end
C∗∗ = {Ck | Uˆk = max{Uˆ1, Uˆ2, Uˆ3, Uˆ4, Uˆ5, Uˆ6, Uˆ7}}
Illustration of Algorithm 3 to the find MEU optimal allo-
cation
First I apply Algorithm 3 to find the MEU optimal allocation, then I illustrate
the local optimal allocation in figure 1.16 to illustrate how we get the global
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optimal allocation. Consider a return table
D =
[
0.7 −0.1 −0.4
−1 −0.9 2.1
]
(1.56)
and a probability lower bound vector
P− =
[
0.2 0.1 0.4
]′
Consider an individual who has MEU Preferences with a CARA utility function
and risk parameter r = 0.002. Then we can write his/her objective function
as
U = −
∑
j
pj
1
0.002
e−0.002wj
Applying Algorithm 3
Find si, i ∈ {1, 2, 3} according to equation (1.39)
s1 = −d12 − d13
d23 − d23 = 0.1
s2 = −d11 − d13
d21 − d23 = 0.35
s3 = −d11 − d12
d21 − d22 = 8
Find the corner probabilities Pi, i ∈ {1, 2, 3} according to equation
(1.35)
P1 = [0.5, 0.1, 0.4]
′
P2 = [0.2, 0.4, 0.4]
′
P3 = [0.2, 0.1, 0.7]
′
Find CAi , i ∈ {1, 2, 3} according to equation (1.49) For CAi the cor-
responding probability vector is Pi. Then by Algorithm 1 we have C1 =
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[66.2 33.8], U˜1 = −393.5, C2 = [0, 66.8], U˜2 = −401.9 andC3 = [0, 100], U˜3 =
−337.3.
Exclude the temporary local optimal allocation of Ai if it is not in the
area of Ai For A1, W = C1D = [12.6 − 37.1 44.4]′ . W(1) = 12.6 6=
min{W}, so we update U˜1 = −Inf . For A2, W = C2D = [−66.8 −
60.1 140.2]
′
. W(2) = −60.1 6= min{W}, so we update U˜2 = −Inf . For
A3, W = C3D = [−100 − 90.1 210.0]′ . W(3) = 210.0 6= min{W}, so
we update U˜3 = −Inf .
Find CLi , i ∈ {1, 2, 3} according to equation (1.55) By Algorithm
1 and assigning probability vectors as P2 and P3 and P1, we get C4 =
[8.5 68.2], U˜4 = −402.0, C5 = [73.8 26.2], U˜5 = −407.6 and C6 =
[0 0], U˜6 = −409.4.
Exclude local optimal allocations according to Table (1.2) As there
is s1 < s2 < s3 we update U˜5 = −Inf
Find MEU utility of C0 according to equation (1.50) C0 = [0 0] and
U˜0 = u(100) = −409.4
Find the global maximum C∗ As U˜4 = max{U˜0, U˜1, U˜2, U˜3, U˜4, U˜5, U˜6}
we have C∗ = C4 = [8.5 68.2].
Illustration for finding the global optimal allocation
Table 1.3 lists all seven local optimal allocations and their corresponding
MEU utility for the purpose of illustration. In Figure 1.16, seven subsets and
their corresponding seven local optimal allocations are marked in Allocation
Triangle. A1 is the area above L3. A2 is the area between L1 and L3. A3 is
the area below L1. As shown in the figure, C1, C2 and C3 are outside their
corresponding areas so are excluded.
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C1
C2
C3
C4
C5
C6
A1
A2
A3
L1
L2
L3
c1
c2
0
(100, 0)
(0,100)
Figure 1.16: Example : The seven Local Optimal Allocations
Ci Local Optimal Allocation Valid U(Ci) U˜i
C0 C0 = [0, 0] YES −409.4 −409.4
A1 C1 = [66.2 33.8] NO −393.5 −Inf
A2 C2 = [0, 66.8] NO −401.9 −Inf
A3 C3 = [0, 100] NO −337.3 −Inf
L1 C4 = [8.5, 68.2] YES −402.0 −402.0
L2 C5 = [73.8, 26.2] NO −407.6 −Inf
L3 C6 = [0, 0] YES −409.4 −409.4
Table 1.3: Example : 7 Local Optimal Allocations
For L1, its local optimal allocation C4 is a valid one. For L2, the line
c2 = s2s1 = 0.35c1 is lying in the area A2 where w2 = min{W}. But
the definition for L2 is w1 = w3 = min{W}. So L2 = ∅ and its local
optimal allocation C5 indicated by the dashed line in this figure. For L3, its
local optimal allocation C6 is a valid one though it coincides with C0. By
assigning −Inf to the utility of invalid optimal allocations, we compare all
utilities and are able to conclude that C4 is the global optimal allocation.
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1.4.4 α-Maxmin Expected Utility (α-MEU) Preferences
α-MEU is a generalisation of MEU. Instead of assuming individuals only look
at the worst case that would happen, α-MEU assumes individuals both look
at the worst case and also the best case. α-MEU introduces a parameter α
which weights the two cases in the objective utility function. Denote P as
the set of all possible priors, and C as the set of all possible allocations, then
the objective function of α-MEU can be written as
U = max
C∈C
αmin
P∈P
∑
j∈{1,2,3}
{pju(wj)}+ (1− α)max
P∈P
∑
j∈(1,2,3)
{pju(wj)}

(1.57)
We can see, when α = 1, α-MEU becomes MEU, which means extreme
ambiguity aversion. When α = 0, the individual only considers the best
case. Just like we describe risk attitude, we can consider this individual as
ambiguity loving. To work out the optimal allocation, we can use a similar
method. Similar to the derivation of equation (1.36), we have
max
P∈P
 ∑
j∈(1,2,3)
{pju(wj)
 = U(Pj,W) s.t wj = max{W} (1.58)
The meaning of equation (1.58) is, the maximum utility is calculated by as-
signing the biggest probability to the state that generates the biggest payoff.
For any given allocation C, we can calculate W and then check the min-
imum and maximum payoff state. Then we assign the biggest probability
to the minimum payoff state and assign the biggest probability to the maxi-
mum payoff state to calculate the minimum Expected Utility and maximum
Expected Utility accordingly. The α-MEU objective function (1.57) can thus
be written as
U = max
C∈C
( αU(Pi,W) + (1− α)U(Pj,W)) (1.59)
s.t. wi = min{W, i ∈ {1, 2, 3}}, wj = max{W, j ∈ {1, 2, 3}}
Now we are not going to develop a similar algorithm as Algorithm 3. But at
least we can improve the totally numerical Algorithm 2 to Algorithm 4 using
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equation (1.59). First we denote K as the total number of C ∈ C.
Algorithm 4: Improved numerical method for finding α-MEU optimal allo-
cation
Input : r, p1, p2, p3, e,D, α
Output: C∗
Calculate P1, P2 and P3;
for k = 1 to K do
// The loop below is for calculating the α-MEU objective
utility for each Ck
W = CkD ;
wi = minW;
wj = maxW;
Uk = αU(Pi,Wi) + (1− α)U(Pj,Wj) ; // calculate the
objective function (1.59) for any given C
end
UK = {Uk|k ∈ [1, K]};
C∗ = {Ck|Uˆk = max{UK};
Notice that Algorithm 4 is plausible when we have a relatively small size for
C.
1.4.5 Conclusion
In this section, we have developed Algorithm 3 for calculating the optimal
allocation for MEU, which is more efficient and reliable than the purely nu-
merical Algorithm 2. We have developed Algorithm 4 to calculate the optimal
allocation for α-MEU. It is plausible when we have a relatively small size of
C.16
16These two algorithms will be called for estimation when we fit these two preferences
theories in the experimental data.
Chapter 2
Portfolio Choice under
Ambiguity - Experiment
1
2.1 Experimental Design
2.1.1 Introduction
In Chapter 1, we provided Algorithms for finding the optimal allocation if indi-
viduals have Expected Utility (EU), Mean Variance (MV), Maxmin Expected
Utility (MEU) and α-MEU preferences. Now we carry out an experiment
to test how well these models work on real data. The problem setup in
the experiment is exactly the same as in the theory. There is one safe as-
set/cash, for which the relative return is 0 and two ambiguous assets, for
which the absolute returns are contingent on the three states. Subjects are
endowed with a certain amount of money e and can allocate the money to
the safe asset and the two ambiguous assets which are both priced at 1 unit
of cash. Subjects can not short sell any asset and they do not need to spend
1This experiment was financed with funds from MIUR.
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Table 2.1: Payoff Table
Pink Green Blue
Asset 1 1.7 0.9 0.6
Asset 2 0 0.1 3.1
all the cash endowment. They can see Payoff Table which gives informa-
tion about the end-of-period total payoff in all three states for each of the
two assets. Also for implementing the experiment, we name the three states
as Pink, Green and Blue respectively (the reason for this terminology will
become clearer later). Thus in the experiment, subjects are given a Payoff
Table with the format as in Table 2.1. Notice that in the theoretical part,
we always employ the asset relative return table for concise mathematical
analysis. But we think Payoff Table is more obvious for subjects so it is used
in the experiment. A Payoff Table implies a unique return table. Consider
a Payoff Table. This means if the Pink state occurs, for every unit of Asset
1 invested the total payoff is 1.7 unit of cash and for Asset 2 is 0. As both
assets are priced as 1 unit of cash, the relative returns for Asset 1 and 2 are
(1.7− 1)/1 = 0.7 and (0− 1)/1 = −1 respectively. The relative return can
be calculated as the payoff minus 1 as the assets are priced at 1. So This
Payoff Table implies the following return table.
D =
[
0.7 −0.1 −0.4
−1 −0.9 2.1
]
Each subject is given a Payoff Table and endowment e, then they are asked to
choose a portfolio. We call this a Problem. Because there are two allocations
(the cash allocation is automatically decided by the two allocations to the
ambiguous assets), it is more informative to let the subjects do an allocation
problem rather than a pairwise problem. So in the experiment, we let the
subjects actually choose the amounts they wish to buy of the two assets. As
we need to specify a particular number of decimal places for the allocation
amounts, we restricted subjects to choosing integer amount (e was always
100). When subjects make the allocations for the two ambiguous assets, the
program calculates the remaining cash and subjects can read the Portfolio
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Table 2.2: Portfolio
Asset 1 c1
Asset 2 c2
Cash e− c1 − c2
Table 2.3: Portfolio Payoff
Pink Green Blue
Portfolio w1 w2 w3
table as shown in Table 2.2. They are also shown a Portfolio Payoff table
which shows the total payoffs in each state for the portfolio they choose. The
availability of the Portfolio Payoff table saves the subjects from complicated
mathematical calculations and lets them focus on choosing their desired
portfolios. The format of the Portfolio Payoff is shown in Table 2.3.
We have
wj = c1d1j + c2d2j + e− c1 − c2
Each subject was given 65 problems. These 65 problems were chosen by us
after extensive simulations 2. In each problem, there is different Payoff Table
but the same cash endowment (100 units of experimental money). As long
as the Payoff Tables are different from problem to problem, each problem is
different from the others. We keep the cash endowment to be the same for
all problems to make the experiment as simple as possible.
The payment is also decided by the colour. Here is how we implemented
ambiguity. We placed a Bingo Blower 3 in the clear view of the subjects and
in continuous motion throughout the experiment. A camera projected the
image of the Bingo Blower onto two screens in the laboratory. The subjects
2We used Matlab to do the simulations; the program is available on request. The
simulation was designed to produce a set of problems that would enable us to distinguish
between subjects in terms of their preference functional and beliefs. Clearly what are
‘good’ problems depends upon what these preferences and beliefs are, so we chose a
range of problems to distinguish different subjects.
3A Bingo Blower is a rectanglular machine with glass sides in which a number of
coloured balls were in continuous motion - being driven by a fan of air.
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were able to see there were balls of three different colours (Pink, Green and
Blue) but they could not count the balls of different colours (because they
are in continuous motion). It is a good way to implement ambiguity in an
experiment. Subjects are able to formulate some belief about the numbers
of each colour, but not form precise probabilities. We actually put 10 pink
balls and 20 green balls and 10 blue balls in the bingo blower so the true
probabilities of the three colours were 0.25, 0.5 and 0.25. It is likely that
subjects realised that the number of green balls were more than pink and
blue. 4
At the end of the experiment, each subject individually drew a ticket from a
bag containing 65 tickets numbering from 1 to 65; this number determined
which problem was to be played out for that subject. Then the subject
was asked expel one ball out of the Bingo Blower - they could not control
the colour to be expelled. The problem to be played out having already
been decided, the colour of the expelled ball determined their payoff (w∗)
in experimental money, taken from the appropriate Payoff Table. Their final
payment in money was that portfolio payoff divided by the exchange rate,
12 units of experimental money equivalent to £1.005, plus a £2.50 show up
fee.
Payment = £(
w∗
12
+ 2.5)
Taking a particular Payoff Table as an example
Pink Green Blue
Asset 1 1.2 0.6 1.6
Asset 2 0.5 1.4 1.4
.
Suppose a subject chose the portfolio [40 30] for the problem that was
randomly selected, then it means his/her cash remaining is 100− 30− 40 =
4This property suggested an interesting heuristic rule which we formulated later. More
details about this heuristic are given in Section 2.3.
5which they had been told in the Instructions.
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30. So his/her portfolio payoff would be
wP = 40 ∗ 1.2 + 30 ∗ 0.5 + 30 = 93
wG = 40 ∗ 0.6 + 30 ∗ 1.4 + 30 = 93
wB = 40 ∗ 1.6 + 30 ∗ 1.4 + 30 = 136
and the corresponding payment for each state would be
PP = 93/12 + 2.5 = 10.3
PG = 93/12 + 2.5 = 10.3
PB = 136/12 + 2.5 = 13.8
2.1.2 Experimental Details
Subjects were asked to arrive at EXEC laboratory at a specific time and then
they were asked to read the Instructions at their seats. After 10 minutes,
they were given a PowerPoint presentation of the experimental instructions,
and then given the chance to ask any questions they may have had. A
short demonstration was given about how the Bingo Blower works. Then
they were asked to read Instructions again. Subjects individually drew the
attention of the experimenter when they were ready to start. As mentioned
in the previsou section when they finished all the questions in the experiment
they needed to draw a ticket and then expel a ball from Bingo Blower as
mentioned in the previous section. Their payment then was calculated and
they were paid. The total time for the experiment was from one hour to 2
hours; most subjects finished in around one-and-a-half hours. The average
payment was £13, including the show-up fee.
Software
The experimental software was written in Visual Basic. It is an executable file
called portfoliochoice.exe which runs under any Windows system. The return
table and endowment for each problem were stored in an Access file which
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was put in the same directory as the executable file. The portfoliochoice.exe
and parameters.mdb were stored on the lab server so every machine in the
lab could run the program and read the input data. When each subject began
the experiment, another Access file under the subject’s number is created;
his/her allocations were stored in that file.
The main experimental interface contains an Allocation Triangle (AT), which
is an important design feature of this experiment. Also on the screen there
were three tables which give information about the assets and the current
portfolio choice. AT is consistent with the definition of the Allocation Tri-
angle in the theory section of this thesis, that is, a triangular area in which
the allocations satisfy the No-short-selling constraints (1.28) on Page 17.
Then any point in AT represents a possible allocation. Notice subjects can
only make integer portfolio choice as any point inside the Triangle will be
automatically rounded to the nearest integer. The three tables are Payoff
Table, Portfolio table and Portfolio Payoff table . They are defined in Table
2.1, 2.2 and 2.3 respectively.
When the main interface was opened, subjects saw the AT with red lines on
the screen. When they moved the cursor inside the AT they saw that each
particular point in the triangle representing an allocation of their 100-unit
endowment of experimental money to the two assets and to residual exper-
imental money. The horizontal distance from the left hand side indicated
the number of units allocated to Asset 1; the vertical distance from the bot-
tom indicated the number of units allocated to Asset 2; the residual amount
of experimental money was then automatically calculated by the software
and shown in Portfolio table. For example, if they put the cursor at the
bottom corner of the AT (actually the mouse cursor always started at this
point which represented their initial situation), this represented buying zero
of both assets and hence the residual cash is 100: the bottom-right hand
corner represented spending all the endowment on Asset 1; the top-left hand
corner represented spending all the endowment on Asset 2; and the middle
of the triangle represented spending one-third of their endowment on Asset
1, one-third on Asset 2 and keeping one-third in the form of experimental
money. Subjects could see this information in the Portfolio table. When
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they moved the cursor inside the AT, the information in the Portfolio table
changed dynamically. Given a Payoff Table, subjects could move the cursor
around in the AT; the Payoff Table changed dynamically according to the
Portfolio table.
Once subjects had decided on their desired allocation, they needed to double
click with their mouse to register the choice. When the cursor was outside
the AT, Portfolio Table and the Payoff Table table became blank; similalry
when subjects double clicked outside the AT, they saw a warning message
in a pop-out window telling them the allocations were invalid. After double
clicking the cursor, subjects were asked to confirm their decision, and they
could change it if they wished (by clicking on ‘No’). To stop subjects just
clicking rapidly through the experiment, we put a minimum time for each
problem of 30 seconds. If they tried to make a decision before it, they would
get a warning box popping out. There was also a maximum time for each
problem of 120 seconds. If a subject did not make a decision in the maximum
time, the progam would record his/her porfolio choice as [0 0]. Subjects see
a timer showing the count-down at the upper-right corner. Figure 2.1 shows
the main screen used in the experiment. The Instructions given to subjects
are attached in Appendix A.
2.1.3 The Design of the Problems
Why did we choose 3 States?
This experiment is to study individuals’ portfolio choices. On the one hand,
there has been at least two states, otherwise the assets are not ambiguous.
On the other hand, we do not want the problems to be too complicated for
subjects. We initially considered having two states cases but decided it was
not informative enough. The reason is as follows. Remember that we use
the return table for the theoretical analysis, so from now we use the term
return table. If there are only two possible states for the ambiguous assets.
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Figure 2.1: Experiment Main Screen
Then the return table is
D =
[
d11 d12
d21 d22
]
and the probability vector is
P =
[
p1 p2
]′
and the portfolio payoff vector is
W = CD =
[
c1d11 + c2d21 + e
c1d12 + c2d22 + e
]
The objective function for EU preferences is
U = p1u(w1) + p2u(w2)
= p1u(c1d11 + c2d21 + e) + p2u(c1d12 + c2d22 + e)
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If we use a CARA utility function u = −1
r
e−rw, the derivative in terms of c1
is
∂U
∂c1
= d11p1e
−r(c1d11+c2d21+e) + d12p2e−r(c1d12+c2d22+e)
= −rd11p1u(w1)− rd12p2u(w2)
Similarly we have
∂U
∂c2
= −rd21p1u(w1)− rd22p2u(w2)
so the the first order conditions becomep1d11u(w1) + p2d12u(w2) = 0p1d21u(w1) + p2d22u(w2) = 0
For this equation system, the solution only exists when the following equation
stands.
(p1d11)(p2d22) = (p1d21)(p2d22) (2.1)
For a CRRA utility function u = w
1−r
1−r , we have that the first order conditions
are  ∂U∂c1 = d11p1w
−r
1 + d12p2w
−r
2
∂U
∂c2
= d12p1w
−r
1 + d12p2w
−r
2
For this equation system, the solution also only exists when equation (2.1)
is satisfied. The intuition here is that when equation (2.1) is satisfied, indi-
viduals can always construct a portfolio that makes the maximised expected
utility infinite. As in the experiment the allocations are bounded, it is likely
subjects will make the same allocations and it would be difficult to estimate
their subjective parameters. So two states are not enough. So we decided on
three states, to keep the experiment as simple as possible for the subjects,
while also being informative to us.
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What are, and do we want, Sure-Win return tables?
A Sure-Win return table is the one that gives subjects the opportunity to earn
from investing in the ambiguous assets irrespective of which state occurs. To
demonstrate such a table we use the terminology of Chapter 1, though we
still do the theoretical analysis with the relative return table. A Sure-Win
return table would not be informative as all the subjects are going to spend
all the cash on the two ambiguous assets in some proportion as long as they
are non-satiated with money. Before I formally define a Sure-Win return
table, I would like to give an example. Consider the return table
D =
[
−0.4 0.4 0.3
0.5 −0.4 0.1
]
Assume that the individuals spend x units of cash in buying the two assets
and let pi be the portion invested in asset 1 and 1− pi in asset 2. Since both
assets are priced at 1, the portfolio is C = [xpi x(1−pi)]. Then the portfolio
payoff vector is
W = CD = x

0.5− 0.9pi + 1
−0.4 + 0.8pi + 1
0.1 + 0.2pi + 1

Let wj > 0 for j ∈ 1, 2, 3 and the solution is
1
2
< pi <
5
9
It means as long as investors make the allocations in the two assets as a
proportion between 1
2
and 5
9
, they will earn more than x irrespective of the
state which occurs. So subjects may just spend all their cash irrespective of
their risk attitudes and their beliefs about the probabilities.6 Sure-Win return
tables should not be included in the experiment as they are not informative in
the sense of revealing information about the subjects preferences and beliefs.
6Notice this is different from the concept of arbitrage. Arbitrage means the opportunity
to construct a portfolio with variance equal to 0. But in this case, the portfolio variance
could still be positive.
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Formal definition A sure win return table means there exists a pi that
makes
wj = pid1j + (1− pi)d2j > 0 for ∀j ∈ {1, 2, 3}
which can be written as 
pi(d21 − d11) < d21
pi(d22 − d12) < d22
pi(d23 − d13) < d23
(2.2)
If we want to exclude Sure-Win return tables, then we need to make sure
there is no solution to equation (2.2). First, if
d2j − d1j > 0 ∀j ∈ {1, 2, 3} (2.3)
then there is always a solution which is
pi < min{ d21
d21 − d11 ,
d22
d22 − d12 ,
d23
d23 − d13} (2.4)
So we should check the return table to make sure that equation (2.3) cannot
be satisfied. By symmetry,
d1j − d2j > 0 ∀j ∈ {1, 2, 3} (2.5)
cannot be satisfied either. The intuition for equation (2.3) and (2.5) is that
there is one asset which dominates the other. That means the return for one
asset is higher than the other in all three states. When they are excluded,
then it means for a return table, the following scenarios exist - one asset has
lower payoff in one state and higher payoffs in the other two states. Assume
it is asset 2. As the order of the states is not important, the return table
can always be arranged to 
d21 − d11 < 0
d22 − d12 > 0
d23 − d13 > 0
(2.6)
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Then equation (2.2) becomes
pi >
d21
d21 − d11
pi <
d22
d22 − d12
pi <
d23
d23 − d13
And then the condition for there to be no solution is
d21
d21 − d11 > min{
d22
d22 − d12 ,
d23
d23 − d13} (2.7)
In conclusion, we can exclude Sure-Win return tables by creating return tables
which satisfy the following conditions.
1. Equation (2.3) and (2.5) are not satisfied.
2. Arrange the return table to let equation (2.6) to be satisfied and hence
let equation (2.7) be satisfied.
Choosing the return tables
As we analyse the experimental data individual by individual, it is important
to give return tables which could be informative enough for us to estimate
subjects’ parameters. We expect heterogeneity in risk aversion and in beliefs
about the priors. Since the subjects’ decisions are determined by the return
table as well as their preferences and beliefs, it is crucial to design a good
set of return tables to be as informative as possible, with respect to the
revelation of subject’s risk and ambiguity attitudes. For example, if all the
return tables are chosen in the sense that the two assets are really ambiguous,
then the majority of subjects would just hold all cash to be safe. Then we
would be unable to distinguish between different attitudes. When we apply
the data to different ambiguity models, we may need to estimate different
parameters. It is hard to design a set of return tables that will be ”good”
for every model.
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Asset 1 Asset 2
Figure 2.2: Histogram of expected return
We are going to estimate the risk and ambiguity parameters of our subjects.
We expected that most of the subjects would be risk-averse. They could
be either extremely risk-averse or approaching risk-neutrality. If subjects are
really risk-averse then it is likely that they do not invest any cash into the
ambiguous assets at all, so we need to give some really attractive return ta-
bles-with high payoff and low risk. If a subject is approaching risk-neutrality,
then he/she is likely to invest all the cash in the ambiguous assets so we
need to include some less attractive return tables. To do this, we calculate
the mean and variance for the two ambiguous assets using the true probabil-
ities p = [0.25, 0.5, 0.25]. Figure 2.2 shows the histograms of the expected
return for both assets. Table 2.4 summarises the mean (expected return)
and variance information for the two assets. Note that for Asset 1, for 18 of
the 65 return tables the expected return are negative, and 6 of the 65 return
tables the expected return negative for Asset 2. There are 50 return tables
in which the covariance of the two assets are positive. Because if the co-
variance is positive, it is more likely subjects want to construct a portfolio of
buying one asset and selling another. But they cannot sell assets since this is
not allowed under the experimental rules. As discussed in Section 1.3, when
the Unconstrained optimal allocation is positive for one asset and negative
for another asset, the Constrained optimal allocation is always putting 0 in
the one which is negative. And it is the same for either Mean Variance or
Expected Utility preferences. So we choose more return tables with positive
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Table 2.4: Mean Variance Information for the 65 return tables
Mean Covariance
≥ 0 < 0 ≥ 0 < 0
Asset1 47 18
15 50
Asset2 59 6
covariances. We still want some return tables with negative covariances be-
cause we are not sure about subjects’ preferences. The negative ones may
lead us to find some interesting results.
As we assume subjects’ beliefs are described by lower bounds on the probabil-
ities, the lower bounds P = [p
1
p
2
p
3
]
′
have to be estimated. So the return
tables need to be designed in such a way that we can estimate the lower
bounds precisely. As stated in equation (1.36), for one return table, only two
lower bounds are actually involved in the optimal allocation. So it means the
loss of information about the lower bound in one state. And it is not clear
which one would be omitted unless we know the subjects’ parameters, since
we do not have an explicit expression of the optimal allocation in terms of
the risk parameter. But what we want to do is to provide to the subjects
a set of problems to reveal all the information about the lower bounds. In
order to realise this we need to do some ‘manipulation’ of the return tables.
The strategy is to add some Least-Payoff return tables, for which the port-
folio payoff in a particular state is always the smallest, and hence the lower
bounds of the other two states will be captured in the optimal solution. We
call such states Least-Payoff states. A least Payoff-State can be created just
by making the portfolio payoff to be the smallest in one state for any portfolio
choice. For example, if we choose state 1 as the least portfolio payoff and
we let d11 = min{d11, d12, d12} and d21 = min{d21, d22, d22} hence
w2 − w1 = (d12 − d11)c1 + (d22 − d21)c2 ≥ 0
w3 − w1 = (d13 − d11)c1 + (d23 − d21)c2 ≥ 0
as we have c1 ≥ 0 and c2 ≥ 0. We have included 31 Least-Payoff return
74
tables in total7, among them there are 15 for state 1, 7 for state 2 and 9 for
state 3.
Conditions for the Optimal Solution
As discussed in the section 1.2, there are explicit solutions for the uncon-
strained portfolio choice problem, though there are some conditions for the
existence for solutions. Because these solutions are to be used in the algo-
rithms to get the Constrained optimal allocation and furthermore the algo-
rithms are called in the estimation program, it is better that we let these
conditions be satisfied. The conditions are different for different preferences
and different utility functions. For Expected Utility preferences with a CARA
utility function the conditions are only related to the return table, but for
Mean-Variance Preferences and EU preferences with CRRA utility function
the conditions also concern the probabilities. As the subjective probabilities
are unknown ex ante, what we can do is to let the return table satisfy the con-
ditions for EU preferences with CARA utility functions, which are equations
(1.20) and (1.23) and (1.24).
2.2 Error Specification
2.2.1 Introduction
Experimental Literature (e.g. Kroll ( et al) 1998) shows Modern Portfolio
choice (MPC) theory does not work well (the allocations are far away from
optimal ) in the laboratory, but surprisingly the Capital Asset Pricing Model,
which is built on MPC, works well at the market level. Bossaerts ( et al)
(2007) propose a CAPM+ model which is not rejected by their experimental
data. In their method they add a utility perturbation to individuals’ demand
functions.
7We do not want to let all 65 return tables to have the property because we do not
want subjects to notice the pattern.
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Most experimental result shows that people are inconsistent even in simple
binary choices experiments when they are asked to repeat the same prob-
lem (Camerer 1989, Starmer and Sugden 1989, Hey and Orme 1994, and
Ballinger and Wilcox 1997). Research results (Hey 1995, Buschena and Zil-
berman 2000) suggest that the standard deviation of error tends to be higher
when subjects are facing problem with more outcomes. So it is not hard to
imagine that the degree of error that subjects would make when they are
facing a portfolio choice problem, if we assume they do have deterministic
preferences. Because a portfolio choice problem basically means that sub-
jects are facing an infinite, or a relatively huge amount of multiple choice
problems. Their brains have to deal with a huge number of the possible
outcomes of their possible choices. Then it strikes me to try to answer the
following question: Is it that Modern Portfolio choice theory really does not
work in the lab, or it does work, but we just have not found the correct model
of the error term?
It appears that the mainstream of experimental study of error stories is in the
environment of pairwise choice problems. When studying portfolio choice,
pairwise choices are less informative than allocation problems. So we hope
our study could be valuable in suggesting the proper stochastic specification
for allocation problems, especially in the scenario where the allocation is
bounded. In most experimental finance studies, the allocations have to be
bounded as we do not want subjects to go bankrupt in an experiment as in
such cases subjects would have to pay money to the experimenter. Besides in
real life there does not exist a situation where people can allocate an unlimited
amount. We emphasise this point here because the stochastic specification
for boundaries raises many interesting issues. Furthermore, as one portfolio
choice involves two allocation, the dependence of the two stochastic variables
makes the problem more complicated, and interesting.
In this chapter, we report on a Portfolio Choice under Ambiguity (PCA) ex-
periment. The intention of conducting this experiment is to shed light on
individual portfolio choice when the assets are ambiguous, rather than risky.
In order to achieve this, first we need to find a good stochastic specification
for our portfolio choice problem. In this section, I discuss the plausibility of
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error stories falling into three categories. The first two categories assuming
there is a deterministic preference and error is coming from the implementa-
tion and the measurement of utility respectively. The third category is rather
different from the first two by assuming the preferences are stochastic and
hence the decisions are stochastic.
2.2.2 Implementation Error
Introduction
In this section, we discuss errors are coming from implementation. For the
time being, we assume that the two allocations are independent. So next
I use c to refer to the two allocations in general. We assume subject have
deterministic preferences which give them an optimal allocation c∗. This
optimal allocation c∗ is decided by the problem itself and their subjective
parameters of preferences.
c∗ = OPT (U(D,S)). (2.8)
here S is a vector that contains the subjects’ parameters. The elements of S
may be different depending on which preference theory we are considering.
For example, if we use Subjective Expected Utility, then S contains the risk
parameter and 3 probabilities for the 3 states. If we use Maxmin Expected
Utility, then S contains risk parameter and 3 lower bounds on probabilities for
the 3 states. Remember in the experiment, subjects can only make integer
allocations. We think this leads to two different mind processing ways when
subjects are making their choices. The first is they think about the allocations
in a continuous sense and hence c∗ is continuous. And when implementing
their intended allocation, they ‘add on’ an error , which is also continuous.
The experimental interface then rounds up c∗ + , which is a continuous
number, to the actual allocation cˆ, which is an integer number. It means for
any observed cˆ, the likelihood is calculated by the cumulative probability at
the point cˆ+ 0.5 minus probability at the point cˆ− 0.5.
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Table 2.5: Error Specifications
Continuous Discrete
- Binomial
Beta Beta Binomial
Biased Beta (BB) Biased Beta Binomial (BBB)
Two Beta1 Two Beta Binomial
Beta Exponential2 -
1 We use a Beta distribution for the open area from 0 to 1 and another Beta
distribution only for boundaries. Similar for the Two Beta Binomial.
2 We use a Beta distribution for the open area from 0 to 1 and a truncated
Exponential distribution only for boundaries.
The second approach is to assume that they discretise the problem so c∗
are integers and the error  is also an integer. So we need continuous and
discrete distributions to model c respectively. Which approach is a realistic
description of the actual processes of the subjects is difficult to say ex ante.
We need to use bounded distribution as c is bounded in the area between 0
and 100 (the cash endowment in each problem being 100). We have to treat
the error stories for the boundaries very carefully, as we will see. In Table
2.5 we summarise the various error stories that we discuss in detail in this
section.
Continuous Stochastic Specification - BB specification
As c ∈ [0, 100] and is continuous, we assume
x ∼ Beta(α, β), 0 ≤ x = c
100
≤ 1
Here we scale the allocation c by the initial endowment e to make it possible
to be represented by a beta distribution, which is defined on the range [0, 1].
We will use the same notation for the scaled allocation x as c. For example,
xˆ =
c
100
means the scaled actual allocation and x∗ =
c∗
100
means the scaled
optimal allocation.
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We want to specify the parameters α and β. Notice that they need to satisfy
α > 0 and β > 0. For a beta distribution, the relation between the mean
x¯, and variance V of its parameters α and β is as follows. The mean and
variance can be calculated from α and β as
x¯ =
α
α + β
V =
αβ
(α + β)2(α + β + 1)
(2.9)
and the α and β can be derived from the mean and the variance asα = (1−x¯V − 1x¯)x¯2β = α( 1
x¯
− 1)
(2.10)
A first possibility is to follow others in assuming that the actual allocations
are centred on their optimal allocation and that the variance of errors made
by subjects is the same everywhere - that is for all x∗ = [0, 1]. But a
constant variance is inappropriate as we think subjects make big error in the
middle and less error when approach to the boundaries. Hey and Pace (2014)
suggest a way of specifying α and β as follows.α = x∗(s− 1)β = (1− x∗)(s− 1). (2.11)
hence the mean and variance are as followsx¯ = x∗V = (1−x∗)x∗
s
(2.12)
where s is defined as precision parameter. They assume the distribution is
centred on the optimal allocation and the variance is specified such that it
is smallest at the boundaries and reaches at the maximum in the middle. In
their case they have 0 < x∗ < 1 while we have 0 ≤ x∗ ≤ 1. According
to equation (2.12), the variance V is equal to 0 when x∗ = 0 or x∗ = 1.
It implies subjects make no mistake at the boundaries. In the experiment,
since subjects are not allowed to short sell, it is likely that they are going to
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the hit the boundaries often8 If we do not want the variance to be equal to
zero at the boundaries, then the distribution of x has to be biased. If we
let x¯ = 0 for x∗ = 0, then the distribution has to be spread both in the
part of x > 0 and x < 0 to make x¯ = 0. As x can not be negative, x¯
has to be positive if the variance is not zero. The similar analysis applies to
the situation when x∗ = 1. x¯ has to be less than one at x∗ = 1. Hence
our solution is to add a bias parameter to x¯. Differently from Hey and Pace
(2014) who assumed that the distribution is unbiased, we assume it is centred
on the biased optimal allocation which is defined as follows.
x
′
=
b
2
+ (1− b)x∗ 0 < b < 1 (2.13)
As we want 0 < x
′
< 1, we let 0 < b < 2. And we also want the x
′
to
be positively related to x∗, we let b < 1. So we assume 0 < b < 1. And
the degree of bias is increasing when x is away from 0.5. When b = 0 we
have x
′
= x∗ then there is no bias. When b = 1 we have x
′
= b
2
which is
not related to x∗, which means subjects’ allocations are total random. As
x ∈ [0, 1] we have x′ ∈ [ b
2
, 1 − b
2
]. There is x
′ − x∗ = b(1
2
− x∗) which can
be seen as a indication of the bias. When x∗ < 1
2
, we have x
′ − x∗ > 0, so
x is positively biased. When x∗ = 1
2
, x is not biased. When x∗ > 1
2
, x is
negatively biased. Notice as x∗ ∈ [0, 1] we have x′ ∈ [ b
2
, 1 − b
2
] and hence
0 < x¯ < 1. We can call x
′
as biased scaled optimal allocation. Replacing x∗
by x′ in equation (2.12), we have a new specification for x as follows.
x¯ = x
′
V =
(1− x′)x′
s
(2.14)
where α and β are as followsα = x
′
(s− 1)
β = (1− x′)(s− 1).
(2.15)
Figure 2.3 on Page 80 shows the relation of V to x∗. We have x
′
= b
2
+
8The experimental data also proves this point.
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Figure 2.3: Concave Variance under Biased Beta Distribution
(1− b)x∗, so V (x∗ = 0) = V (x∗ = 1) = 1
4
(2−b)b
s
6= 0 which are the minima
and V (x∗ = 0.5) = 1
4s
which is the maxima. So far we have constructed a
satisfactory biased beta distribution specification, which we call Biased Beta
specification. Equation (2.16) shows the complete Biased Beta specification.
x ∼ Beta(α, β), 0 ≤ x ≤ 1 (2.16)
where 
x
′
= b
2
+ (1− b)x∗
α = x
′
(s− 1)
β = (1− x′)(s− 1).
and
0 < b < 1, s > 1
Denote F (x;α, β) 9as the cumulative distribution function for a beta distri-
bution. Now we can write the sum of the log-likelihood function for the 65
9When x > 1 we have F = 1, and when x < 0 we have F = 0.
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problems Cj = [cˆ1, cˆ2], j ∈ N+65 as
L =
65∑
j
log
(
2∏
i
Lij
)
, i ∈ N+2 , j ∈ N+65 (2.17)
where
Lij = F (
cˆij + 0.5
100
, αi, βi)− F ( cˆij − 0.5
100
, αi, βi), c
∗
ij ∈ N100
where 
αi =
(
bi
2
+ (1− bi)
c∗ij
100
)
(si − 1)
βi =
(
1− bi
2
− (1− bi)
c∗ij
100
)
(si − 1)
0 < bi < 1, si > 1.
Now let us explore a little more the implications about this specification,
especially the implication of the precision and bias parameters, as they have
not been used before with this particular specification.
Figure 2.4 10 on Page 82 shows the pdf for different values of s and b
when x∗ = 0 and x∗ = 0.5.The mean of the both distributions are equal to
x
′
= x∗ + b
2
= 0.05. Assume the same bias parameter. The individual with
lower precision, say s=5, is likely to make bigger errors overall. But he/she
seems to better express his intention when x∗ approaches the boundaries.
The likelihood of choosing 0 (also the ones quite near 0) when x∗ = 0 is
much bigger for s=5 than for s=50. This does not seem to be quite sensible.
So we ask the question: Is it sensible to add a bias to a whole range when
we only want to tackle the issue concerning the boundaries?
So let us now focus on how to specify the biased distribution only at the
boundaries. We would like to think the mode of the distribution is at the
boundaries, it means we assume subjects are most likely to choose the bound-
aries when the actual optimal allocation is at the boundaries. The relation
10For better demonstration for the pdf functions, the range for x is set from 0 to 0.4
instead of 0 to 1 when in the case x∗ = 0.
82
0 0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.25 0.3 0.35 0.4
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
x (x*=0, x′=0.05)
pd
f
 
 
s=50,b=0.1
s=5,b=0.1
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
x (x*=0.5, x′=0.5)
pd
f
 
 
s=50,b=0.1
s=5,b=0.1
Figure 2.4: Biased Beta pdf for x∗ = 0 and x∗ = 0
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of the mode to the parameters for a beta distribution is as follows.
Mo =
α− 1
α + β − 2 , α > 1, β > 1
It implies Mo = 0 when α = 1, β > 1Mo = 1 when α > 1, β = 1
When α = 1, β > 1, we get a distribution whose mode is equal to 0 and
the pdf is strictly decreasing. We can use it to model the distribution when
x∗ = 0. It seems sensible to assume that the most likely choice for x is equal
to 0 when x∗ = 0. When α > 1, β = 1, we have Mo = 1 and the pdf
is strictly increasing, which could be used to specify the distribution when
x∗ = 1. Figure 2.5 on Page 83 shows the pdf for these two special cases.
We would like to assume that the distributions at the two boundaries are
symmetric by letting x ∼ Beta(1, b) when x∗ = 0, and x ∼ Beta(b, 1) when
x∗ = 1. When 0 < x∗ < 1, we assume the unbiased Beta distribution which
centred on the x∗. We call this specification as the Two Betas specification
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as it involves two different types of Beta distributions. Equation (2.18) shows
the complete Two Betas specification.
x ∼ Beta(1, b), x∗ = 0
x ∼ Beta(α, β) 0 < x∗ < 1
x ∼ Beta(b, 1), x∗ = 1
(2.18)
where α = x∗(s− 1)β = (1− x∗)(s− 1).
and
b > 1, s > 1
Now we can write the sum of likelihood function for the 65 portfolio choice
Cj = [cˆ1, cˆ2], j ∈ N+65 as
L =
65∑
j
log
(
2∏
i
Lij
)
, i ∈ N+2 , j ∈ N+65 (2.19)
where
Lij =

F (
0.5
100
, 1, bi) if c
∗
ij = 0
F (
cˆij + 0.5
100
, αi, βi)− F ( cˆij − 0.5
100
, αi, βi) if c
∗
ij ∈ N99+
1− F ( cˆij
100
, bi, 1) if c
∗
ij = 100
where 
αi =
c∗ij
100
(s1 − 1)
βi = (1−
c∗ij
100
)(s2 − 1)
bi > 1, si > 1.
85
Beta Exponential
We have put a lot of effort into modelling the error at the boundaries. One
might think, why not just use a truncated distribution for the boundaries? We
have explored this possibility too. We still keep using the scaled allocation x
for analysis here. Let us assume that x has an (unbiased) Beta distribution,
when 0 < x∗ < 1, but let us assume that it has an exponential distribution
when x∗ = 0 or 1. Next I go through the details about this specification.
Suppose we use a exponential distribution to model the distribution when
x∗ = 0. The pdf for an exponential distribution is
f(x;λ) =
 1λe−
1
λ
x x ≥ 0
0 x < 0
and we have x¯ = λ and V (x) = λ and the mode Mo = 0. It is good in
the way that the pdf is monotonically decreasing from 0. As the exponential
distribution is defined in [0, ∞], we need to truncate the part that x > 1.
Denote F (x;λ) as the probability mass function. We cannot just do the
following.
L(1) = F (∞;λ)− (0.995;λ)
11 as it gives a big likelihood for x = 1. Figure 2.6 on Page 86 shows the pdf
for λ = 0.3. The cumulative probability from 0.995 to∞ is equal to 0.0363.
We have L(0.99) = F (0.995; 0.3) − F (0.985; 0.3) = 0.0012 < L(1). It
means the subject is more likely to choose 1 than 0.99. This is not sensible.
We need to truncate the exponential distribution and scale the pdf as follows.
f(x;λ) =
1
λ
e−
1
λ
x
1− (F (∞;λ)− F (1;λ)) , 0 ≤ x ≤ 1
For x∗ = 1, we can use the rescaled distribution of x∗. The pdf is as follows.
f(x;λ) = 1−
1
λ
e−
1
λ
x
1− (F (∞;λ)− F (1;λ)) , 0 ≤ x ≤ 1
11Remember that in the experiment, an observed allocation 100 is assumed to be
rounded, so the likelihood is calculated from 99.5 to 100.
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Figure 2.6: Truncated Exponential Distribution for x∗ = 0
The sum of the log-likelihood function is similar to that in equation (2.19)
so we do not give details here.
Discrete Stochastic Specification - the BBB specification
Hareless and Camerer (1994) proposed the use of a tremble to model the
stochastic process involved in the actual decision. Their story is based on a
pairwise-choice problem, either choose lottery l1 or lottery l2 in a problem.
They think individuals’ behaviour rule could be explained by a deterministic
preference theory plus a tremble. Denote S as a unique set of parameters
represents an individual’s preferences. Determined by his/her preferences, an
individual has an optimal decision l∗ which also can be called the individual’s
intended decision. They further claim that a subject will make a mistake in
implementation with a constant probability λ by choosing otherwise instead
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of l∗ across all problems.
lˆ =
l∗ p = 1− λ{l1, l2} − {l∗} p = λ
This model can be adapted to our portfolio choice problem, by discretisation
of the allocations. Remember in the experiment, there are two allocations
in one portfolio choice problem, which we denote by C = [c1, c2]. The
allocation can only be made in integers and they satisfy
c1 ≥ 0, c2 ≥ 0, c1 + c2 ≤ 100
In a pairwise-choice experiment, the choice is between two options while we
have 5151 choices in the experiment.12 We can think in this way. Sub-
jects have a deterministic decision C∗, which is in integer, based on their
preferences, but when they implement their decisions they make mistakes by
choosing another. It might because that they tremble away from C∗ when
they are clicking the mouse. And the further away a choice from C∗, the
less likely subjects choose it by mistake. The stochastic specification of c is
written as follows.
cˆ =

...
c∗ − 1 pc∗−1
c∗ pc∗
c∗ + 1 pc∗+1
...
12Assuming that c1 and c2 are independent, so for each of them the total number is
101. But all possible portfolio choices are not simply 101*101 as c1 + c2 ≤ 100. For
example, if the total endowment is 5 then for each of them the total number of possible
allocation is 36. But the possible portfolios are [0, 0], [0, 1], [0, 2], [0, 3],[0, 4], [0, 5], [1, 0],
[1, 1], [1, 2], [1, 3], [1, 4], [2, 0], [2, 1], [2, 2], [2, 3], [3, 0], [3, 1], [3, 2], [4, 0], [4, 1], [5, 0].
The total number pf possible portfolio choice is only 21. Similarly, when the endowment
in 100, the total number of portfolio choice is 5151. More details about the independence
of the two allocations will be discussed later in this section.
88
0 20 40 60 80 100
0
5
10
15
20
25
c*
V
 
 
b=0.1
b=0.01
Figure 2.7: Variance for different bias
The Binomial distribution seems to be a possible specification of the tremble.
Denote by Bin(p, n) a binomial distribution with probability parameter p ≥ 0
and n ∈ N+. The variable has a discrete distributed over the set of integers
between 0 and n, with mean c¯ = np and V = np(1−p). Let us assume that
c ∼ Bin(p∗, 100) where p∗ = c
∗
100
hence that the mean of c is c∗. There is no parameter to be estimated, that
is we are assuming all subjects are making the same errors. Given that we
think that heterogeneity (over subjects) in error is important in our problem,
this Binomial distribution does not seem to be a good specification.
A way round this problem is to use a Beta-Binomial distribution. Such a
distribution can be thought of as a binomial distribution
c ∼ Bin(p, n)
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where the probability parameter
p ∼ Beta(α, β).
This Beta-Binomial involves two steps of stochastic processes. The first step
is in generating the probability parameter p from the beta distribution. The
second is generating the actual allocation from a Binomial Distribution using
that probability parameter, which we denote as pˆ. The probability mass
function for a Beta-Binomial distribution is
fBB(cˆ|α, β, n) =
(
n
k
)
fBeta(k + α, n− k + β)
fBeta(α, β)
(2.20)
here fBeta is the probability density function for Beta distribution.
We can let the mean of p to be equal p∗ and the variance to be related to p∗
and another parameter s, which we call the precision. This extra parameter
allows us to estimate subjects’ heterogeneity in errors. Before we go further,
we should warn ourselves about the implications of assuming that the mean
of p is equal to p∗. Remember in the continuous case, we found that there
is no variance for a Beta distribution at the boundaries 0 and 1. And we do
not want to assume that subjects do not make mistakes at the boundaries.
We have the same problems here. If we let p be centred on p∗, then pˆ equal
to 0 for sure when p∗ = 0 instead of stochastically generated from a Beta
Distribution. Furthermore, the variance is equal to zero again for a Binomial
Distribution Bin(0, n). We fail to incorporate variance for p∗ = 0 in both
steps. The same analysis applies to the case when p∗ = 1. Luckily we have
solved a similar problem in the continuous case by adding bias, which makes
sure that the Beta distribution is not centred on either 0 or 1. The bias can
be added over the whole range of p∗ = [0, 1] and also can only be added at
the boundaries. If we add the bias over the whole range, we let p be centred
on p′, which is defined as following
p
′
=
c∗
100
(1− b) + b
2
, 0 < b < 1, (2.21)
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Here we obtain equation (2.21) by the inspiration of equation (2.13). Sup-
pose x∗ = 0, then we have p∗ = 0 and p
′
= b
2
> 0. So pˆ is stochastically
generated from a Beta distribution with mean equal to b
2
> 0. Notice the
actual allocation c ∼ Bin(pˆ, 100) and pˆ could still be equal to 0. But we
do not need to worry about it, as we have already incorporated the variance
from the first step. We still need to specify the variance for p. In the con-
tinuous case, we decided that a constant variance does not seem to be a
good specification for bounded distribution as in our setting. So again, we
use similar specification as we use in the continuous case. We specify α and
β as follows. α = p
′
(s− 1)
β = (1− p′)(s− 1).
(2.22)
hence 
p¯ = p
′
V =
(1− p′)p′
s
.
(2.23)
here s > 1 is a precision parameter s, which allows us to specify subjects’
heterogeneity in errors. Here we obtain equation (2.22) by replacing x′ with p
′
in equation (2.15). By specifying α and β as in equation (2.22) for equation
(2.20), we completed the specification for Biased Beta Binomial distribution.
Remember that Biased Beta-Binomial distribution is the case in which we
add the bias over the whole range. We can also add bias only for the bound-
aries. We call this specification as Two Beta-Binomial distribution and its
specification is as follows.
P (cˆ)13

fBB(cˆ|b, 1, 100), cˆ = 0
fBB(cˆ|α, β, 100), cˆ ∈ N99
fBB(cˆ|1, b, 100), cˆ = 014
(2.24)
13When c∗ = 0 and hence p∗ = 0, we assume p ∼ Beta(b, 1) which guarantees the
mode of the distribution is at 0 and is monotonically decreasing from 0 to 1. The mean
is equal to b1+b > 0, so the distribution of p is positively biased. When c
∗ = 1 and hence
p∗ = 1, we assume pis ∼ Beta(1, b) which guarantees the mode of the distribution is at
1 and the pdf is monotonically decreasing from 1 to 0. The mean is equal to 11+b < 1,
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where 
α = p∗(s− 1)
β = (1− p∗)(s− 1)
0 < b < 1, s > 1
Remark : Independence Issues about Two allocations
So far we have assumed c1 and c2 are independent, in terms of both the
optimal allocation c∗1, c
∗
2 and the errors. Though the optimal allocations
satisfy the constraint c∗1 + c
∗
2 ≤ 100, the actual allocation implied by these
stochastic modelling does not necessarily satisfy cˆ1 + cˆ2 ≤ 100. For example,
c∗1 = 40 and c
∗
2 = 40. Suppose they are independently distributed in [0, 100],
then it is possible that cˆ1 = 56 and cˆ2 = 44 and hence cˆ1 + cˆ2 = 110 ≤ 100.
Such violations do not happen in the experimental data as subjects can
not implement such a portfolio. So we may have a divergence between
the error story model and its application when we are estimating data. The
subjects might choose one allocation first and then another allocation, whose
error has to be conditioned on the first allocation. Or they choose the two
allocations simultaneously and the errors are formulated in a specific way. We
have only considerred the first possibility in our specifications. Take Biased
Beta-Binomial distribution for an example. When c∗1 = 40, b1 = 0.2 and
c∗2 = 40, b2 = 0.2, we have p
′
1 = p
′
2 = 0.42 by equation (2.21), then
c1 ∼ Bin(0.42, 100), c2 ∼ Bin(0.42, 100) (2.25)
The distributions of c1 and c2 are shown in Figure 2.8 on Page 93. The two
distributions are exactly the same as they have the same parameters. But if
so the distribution is negatively biased. When cˆ ∈ N99, the specification of α and β
guarantees the mean and variance to be follows.p¯ = p
∗
V =
(1− p∗)p∗
s
.
As p¯ = p∗, the distribution of p over 0 < p∗ < 1is unbiased. We have discussed this in
detail when we specified the Biased Beta specification in the continuous case in equation
(2.18).
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cˆ1 = 30, the area from 70 to 100 are actual not valid as cˆ2 can not exceeding
70. This is the situation when cˆ1 < c
∗
1. When cˆ1 = 60 > c
∗
1 the area is
relatively bigger in the shadowed area, which is around 0.04.
Define c2 on 100 − c∗1 Instead of assuming both the two allocations are
distributed on [0, 100], an alternative way is assuming
c1 ∼ Bin(p′′1 , 100), c2 ∼ Bin(p
′′
2 , 100(1− p
′′
1)) (2.26)
where 
p
′′
1 =
c∗1
100
(1− b1) + b12
p
′′
2 =
c∗2
100
(1− b2) + b22
1− p′′1
such that c1 and c2 are still centred on their own biased optimal allocation.
It seems that the specification in equation (2.26) is more sensible; after all
it incorporates the constraints that c∗1 + c
∗
2 ≤ 100. Take c∗1 = 40, b1 = 0.2
and c∗2 = 40, b1 = 0.2 as an example. By equation (2.27), we have p
′′
1 =
40
100
(1− 0.2) + 0.2
2
= 0.42 and p
′′
2 =
40
100∗(1−0.42)(1− 0.2) + 0.22 = 0.47
c1 ∼ Bin(0.42, 100), c2 ∼ Bin(0.72, 58)
The distribution of c1 is exactly the same as in Figure 2.8. Figure 2.9 on
Page 94 shows the distribution of the c2 in this case. Their means are the
same while the variance of c2 is less than c1 though they share the the same
parameters. That is because the range of c2 is reduced from 0 to 100 to 0 to
100− c2. Again it does not totally eliminate the possibility of cˆ1 + cˆ2 > 100,
but at least it is less likely to happen as many times as the specification
defined in equation (2.25). But it does not cover a lot of possibilities for c2.
For example, if c1 = 30, c2 can be between 0 to 70. But in this specification,
the likelihood of any number more than 58 is equal to 0 as c2 is defined on
0 to 58.
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Figure 2.8: Biased Beta Binomial distributions of c1 and c2
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Figure 2.9: Beta Binomial Distribution of c2 ∼ Bin(p′2, 100− c∗1)
Define c2 on 100− cˆ1 Another way of is to assume
c1 ∼ Bin(p′′′1 , 100), c2 ∼ Bin(p
′′′
2 , 100− cˆ1) (2.27)
where 
p
′′′
1 =
c∗1
100
(1− b1) + b12
p
′′′
2 =
c∗2
100
(1− b2) + b22
1− cˆ1
100
This specification guarantees that cˆ1 + cˆ2 ≤ 100. But p′′′2 can be bigger than
1 when cˆ1 < c
∗. For example, cˆ2 = 60 we have p
′′′
2 =
0.42
1− 0.6 > 1.
2.2.3 Stochastic Utility
We have been assuming the cˆ1 cˆ2 are independent. Figure 2.10 on Page 95
shows the Indifference Curves in the Allocation Triangle. In the direction of
OO1 the expected utility decreases at the largest speed, while in the direction
OO2 it decreases at the minimum speed. If two points in these two directions
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Figure 2.10: Indifference Curve in Allocation Triangle
have the same distance to the optimal allocation, the likelihoods calculated
are the same which seems inplausible on the direction of OO1 as it generates
lower expected utility.
Hey and Orme (1994) proposed a model of adding noise to the valuation of
the gambles. They assumed that subjects make mistakes when they measure
the possible valuations in a problem. Denote U as subjects’ utility function
and C as all possible allocations. Instead of finding a optimum to maximise
their utility function U, they think subjects are maxmising the stochastic
valuation.
Cˆ∗ = OPT (Uˆ), Uˆ = U(D,S) +  (2.28)
In the original Hey-Orme model paper, they considered pairwise-choice prob-
lems. It is relatively easy to understand this model in that setting. That is,
subjects makes mistakes when measuring the vauation of the two lotteries
and take the better one from the mistaken valuation. They assume the error
is a so called white noise, which means a normally distribution with mean
to be equal to 0 and and with a constant standard error. Later Hey (1995)
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Table 2.6: Portfolio Choice with Stochastic Valuation
U ( U∗ = Uj ) Uˆ = U∗ +  (Uˆ∗ = Uk)
C1 U1 U1 + 1
...
...
...
C∗ = Ch U∗ = Uh Uh + h
...
...
...
Cˆ∗ = Ck Uj Uk + 1
...
...
...
C5151 U5151 U5151 + 5151
generalised the model by assuming the error to be heteroskedastic, that is
related to the each problem itself. This seems easy to understand. Assume
an individual is asked to solve two problems. In the first one he could earn
a maximum of £100 and minimum of £90 In the second one he could earn
£1000 and could lose £1000. Then it is not hard to imagine that the he
would try harder to make less mistake in the second one. So the error for
the second problem is likely to be smaller. But for time being, let us explore
the possibility of applying this model in our setting. Consider the discrete
portfolio choice.15 Remember that there are 5151 possible portfolio choices
in Cj, j ∈ N+5151. As shown in Table 2.6 on page 96, for each portfolio choice
Cj, there is a corresponding utility denoted as Uj. But subjects evaluates
Uj as Uˆj by mistake, here Uˆ = U + . If subjects make no errors, they
would choose Cj as it produces the maximised utility. But since they make
mistakes when evaluating prospects, they will choose Ck instead, as Uˆj is
the maximised noised valuation.
15When applying the Hey-Orme story, I use the discrete set-up. Because we want to
assume the error is heteroscedastic. So we need to find the magnititude of the difference
between the best case and worst case for each problem. That is, among all 5151 possible
choices, we need calculate the minimum utility and maxmimum utility. In the discrete
optimisation routine it is easy to do so as we calculate the utilities for all choices. Before
we just pick out the best one. Now we can just add another line to identify the minimum
one. But in the the continuous optimisation routine, we have used the first order condition
to help find the optimal allocation. We do not see a efficient way to find the allocation
which minimises the utility function, which are all concave.
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Suppose we can assume j ∼ N(Uj, σ2) and for portfolio choice its j are
independent from each other. We assume subjects have constant variance
for all problems. Notice here Uˆ can be more than U∗. Blavatskyy (2007)
suggests that truncating the error such that the stochastic utility is inside
the area of the minimum utility and maximum utility. For now let us just
keep it simple. We think stochastic utility model would be really suitable for
specifying portfolio choice errors. But the problem is, we do not have clear
idea to construct the likelihood function for a observed portfolio choice Cˆ.
This could be future work.
2.2.4 Random Preference Model
Random Preference theory (Loomes and Sugden 1995) might be a good way
to specify the errors in the sense that it captures the correlation of the two al-
locations. Notice that Random Preference theory is very different from what
we have done before where we assumed an implementation error. Instead
of assuming the actual implemented choice are stochastic, they assume that
preference function does not have determistic parameters but ones that are
stochastic. In our experiment, if we fit the MEU model, we have the set
of parameter S = [r, p
1
, p
2
, p
3
], which are the risk parameter and the three
lower bounds on probabilities. We assume r is stochastic while p are non-
stochastic. 16 Assuming the element rˆ for each decision choice is randomly
generated from a normal distribution N (r¯, σ), each set of observations of
choice Cˆj can be rationalised as
Sj = [rˆj, p1, p2, p3] = U−1(Cˆ) (2.29)
here U−1 means the inverse function of U as defined in equation (2.8). For
65 problems, we calculate the mean and standard deviation of r, which we
16If we also assume the lower bounds are stochastic, then we have to assume all three are
as they are indifferent from each other. But we have 0 ≤ p1 and 0 ≤ p
1
+ p
2
+ p
3
≤ 1. It
would be difficult to implement as a two-allocation choice make the stochastic specification
very complicated.
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Figure 2.11: Optimal Allocations for different risk parameter
denote by r¯ and σr. The sum of the log-likelihoods function is written as
L =
65∑
j
log(f(rˆj, r¯, σ)) (2.30)
here f is the probability density function of normal distribution
f(rˆj, r¯, σ) =
1
σ
√
2pi
e−
(rˆ−r¯)2
2σ2
As we assume r ∈ N (r¯, σ2), there is no constraint on it so the specification
is less messy. But here is the problem. In order to use this model, the
optimisation function U needs to be invertible, that is there always exists
a risk parameter which can rationalise any given observed optimal choice.
Unfortunately for the optimisation function, which is based on either MEU,
EU or MV preference theory, cannot do this. Figure 2.11 on Page 98 shows
an example of the optimal allocation of MEU preference given different risk
parameters. We can see that in general, any point between the the lines
cannot be rationalised by the any risk parameters.
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2.2.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, we have discussed stochastic specifications for portfolio prob-
lems. There are two major possibilities of the stochastic specification. One
is to assume errors come from implementation. Another is to assume errors
come from evaluating the prospects. We have given a formal analysis for
the first possibility, both in the discrete and the continuous cae. We have
discussed the possibilities for the second possibility, and pointed out the their
advantages and difficulties of applications.
2.3 Experimental Analysis and Results
2.3.1 Introduction
In the experiment, we had 77 subjects. Each subject made 65 portfolio
choices C, with each choice containing two allocations c1 and c2. We use
four preference theories, α-Maxmin Expected Uitlity (α-MEU), Maxmin Ex-
pected Utility (MEU), Subjective Expected Utility (SEU), Mean-Variance, to
explain the data. We also use Safety-First (SF), which is a heuristic rule to
explain the data. We use two different error stories, which are the Biased
Beta-Binomial (BBB) specification and the Biased Beta (BB) specification.
We then combine different preference theories, including SF (which we de-
scribe below), combined with the two error stories to fit the data using Max-
imum Likelihood Estimation (MLE). BBB specification assumes the subjects
are calculating in integers and make errors in integers, and BB specification
assumes subjects are calculating continuously and also make continuous er-
rors. Table 2.7 shows the preferences theories we have estimated with BBB
or BB respectively. The reason why we do not combine α-MEU and SF with
BB is that it is very difficult to calculate the continuous optimal allocation.
In the experiment, as we have imposed the No-short-selling constraint, we
have no explicit solution for any objective function for any preference theories
other than EU. We have developed a reliable and precise algorithm for finding
the MEU optimal allocation building on the EU solution. We could develop a
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Table 2.7: Estimation Methods
BBB(discrete) BB (continuous)
Preference Theory α-MEU, MEU, EU, MV, SF MEU, EU
similar one for α-MEU and SF but it would be very difficult. We also do not
trust the purely numerical method, that is optimising the objective function
using the built-in optimisation routine in most mathematical software, be-
cause of the fact that the objectives functions for α-MEU and SF are kinked.
So we only use the Grid search method to find the integer optimal alloca-
tion for α-MEU and SF. And so they are only combined with the discrete
specification. The general idea for grid search is that we calculate the utility
for all possible allowable portfolio choices which can be implemented in the
experiment, which are 5151 sets, and pick out the one with the maximum
utility.
This section is organised as follows. In Section 2.3.2 I introduce the SF
rule. In Section 2.3.3 I demonstrate the algorithms for finding the optimal
allocation for α-MEU, ME, SEU,MV and SF using the Grid Search Method.
In Section 2.3.5, I compare the results of different preference theories and
error models using statistical tests. In Section 2.3.6 I present other interesting
findings in the estimation results. Section 2.3.7 concludes.
2.3.2 Heuristic Rule - Safety-First (SF)
At the end of each session of the experiment, we gave a short post-experimental
questionnaire to the subjects. Many of the subjects claimed that they fol-
lowed a two-step simple heuristic rule: first they make sure that the payoff
in each state is above a threshold; then they look for an allocation that max-
imises the payoff in the Green state. The green balls are half of the total
number in the Bingo Blower, so subjects are almost certain that the the prob-
ability for a Green ball to be chosen is the largest, though they do not know
the exact probability. We think this rule may come from subjects’ reaction
to ambiguity. For the first step, we think it suggests ambiguity aversion. For
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the second step, it does not necessary to be seen as ambiguity averse. Next
I present the formal construction of the SF rule.
The maximisation function is easy to explain with matrices. Remind ourselves
that C = [c1, c2] is a 1*2 matrix, which represents the the two allocations.
And the return table D is a 2 by 3 matrix, with each row giving the return
for the assets in the 3 states. In the experiment, we used colour Pink, Green
and Blue to present the three states. The colour Green corresponds to state
2, so its return is the second column in D. The payoff for a portfolio in
the three states is W = CD which is a 1*3 vector. So the payoff of a
portfolio for in state 2 is the second column in W. And that is the number
that subjects would like to maximise, with the constraints that each element
in W is bigger than w, which is the minimum payoff that subjects want to
keep.
C∗ = max{W(2)} s.t. W (i) ≥ w, i = 1, 2, 3 (2.31)
2.3.3 Grid Search Method of Finding Optimal Alloca-
tion
The general idea of the Grid Search Method is to calculate the utility of a
specific preferences theory for all possible portfolio choices and then choose
the one with the highest utility. It is reliable and efficient, when the size of the
choices is not too large. In our experiment, we have 5151 possible choices,
this method has proved to be more efficient than using the algorithms for
finding continuous optima. The former takes just 5% of the time of the
latter. We suspect subjects may also arrive at their portfolio choice also
based on the integers. To implement this method, first we work out the
set of portfolio choices C. The procedure is first let c1 = 0, then we have
c2 ∈ N100, which is any integer number from 0 to 100. We then repeat this
step with c1 = 1. Generally when c1 = i, then c2 ∈ N100−i. Then we save
all choices in a 5151*2 matrix file under the name C. Then we calculate the
102
utility for ∀C ∈ C.17 As all possible utility values are there, it is easy to find
the the maximised one and the corresponding optimal allocation. We next
give the details for SF Optimal Allocation and state briefly the algorithms
for the remaining theories as they are similar to SF.
SF Optimal Allocation
Algorithm 5: Safety-First Optimal Choice
Input : w, C, D
// w: lower bound for payoff
// C: (5151*2 matrix) The set of all possible portfolio
choice in integers
// D: return table
Output: C∗ : Optimal Allocation
// calculate the payoff of 3 states for all allocations W:
5151*3 matrix
W = CD;
// check each row of W if there is any number less than
the lower bound. If so, assign the second element (the
payoff in green state) of that row as minus Infinity.
Doing so we eliminate this portfolio choice as it
violates the lower bound condition
W(any(W < w, 2), 2) = −Inf ;
// in the updated W find the highest number in second
column and read its index maxnum. We do not need to know
the highest number itself, so we use ∼ means we do not
need that value
[∼,maxnum] = max(W (:, 2));
// use the index to find the optimal allocation in C
C∗=C(maxnum,:)
The objective function for SF preferences is defined in function (2.31). The
general routine is as follows. First, for each portfolio choice Ci ∈ C, i ∈
17We could also write a loop for doing this instead of work out the set of portfolio
choices first. But in Matlab, it is always much efficient to use matrix calculation than
writing a loop is Matlab is designed for matrix calculation.
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N+5151, we calculate the payoff for each 3 states. If for any C, there is a
state in which the payoff is less than the subjects’ lower bound w, then we
eliminate its possibility to be the optimal allocation. Then in the remaining
set, we look for the optimal allocation for which the payoff in state 2 is the
highest among all remaining portfolio choices. Notice here for calculating
the optimal allocation, the subject’s only parameter is the lower bound w.
Algorithm 5 on Page 102 shows the pseudo code for finding the optimal
allocation for SF rule in Matlab.
Notice SF is a rather simple heuristic rule. It differs radically from the rule
followed by a expected payoff maximiser. First, it assumes that the individual
has a required minimum portfolio payoff, no matter which state occurs. Sec-
ond individuals do not care about the probability weighted expected payoff.
They only maximise the payoff in the state that is most likely to happen. We
use the BBB stochastic specification because we solved the maximisation
problem in the discrete setting. So the parameters estimated are
SSF = SMV = [w, s1, b1, s1, s2]
where w is the minimum payoff s and b are the precision and bias parameters
for the two allocations. Notice that in both the BBB and BB specification,
we have 4 parameters s1, b1, s1, s2 to be estimated no matter what preference
theory we are assuming. We call these four parameters as error parameters
and other parameters, which are related to individuals’ preferences, as pref-
erence parameters. In the case of SF, there is only one preference parameter,
w.
EU, MEU, α-MEU
Grid Search in EU is straightforward. We calculate the expected utility ∀C ∈
C given subjects’ parameter set, the risk parameter r, and the subjective
probability vector P = [p1, p2, p3]
′
. Then we locate the optimal allocation as
that with the maximised utility.
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For MEU, we have an extra step compared with EU. Given the risk parameter,
and subjective probability lower bound vector P = [p
1
, p
2
, p
3
]
′
, we calculate
three expected utilities [U1, U2, U3] for each allocation based on three prob-
ability sets 18 and choose the minimum one which we call it minEU. Then
we repeat the step similar to EU, locating the optimal allocation with the
maximised minEU.
For α-MEU, we need one extra subject’s parameter α, which measures the
subject’s ambiguity aversion level. The difference from calculating utility
from MEU is that we take into acccount both minEU and maxEU, which is
the maximum in [U1, U2, U3] as follows
U = αminEU + (1− α)maxEU
The details are in Algorithm 4 on Page 59.
2.3.4 Estimation Method
The general procedure is as follows. We specify the parameter space S.
Then we search S ∈ S and use the preference parameters of it to calculate
its theoretical optimal allocations. Then we use the error parameters of it,
along with the theoretical optimal allocations using the appropriate error
specification to calculate the sum of the log-likelihoods. The optimal S∗ is
the one maximises the sum of the log-likelihoods. Table 2.8 summarises the
preference parameters estimated for each preference theory. Notice that for
EU and MV, though it seems we have to estimate p1, p2, p3, there are only
two free parameters as one of them is 1 minus the other two. Next I use
MEU (BB) as an example to illustrate the method. For MEU, the estimated
parameters is
SMEU = [p
1
, p
1
, p
1
, r, s1, b1, s1, b2]
18They are P1 = [1 − p2 − p3, p2, p3]
′
, P2 = [p1, 1 − p1 − p3, p3]
′
, P3 = [p1, p1, 1 −
p
2
− p
3
]
′
.
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Algorithm 6: Estimation for MEU preferences
Input : Dn, Cn where n ∈ [1, N ],e
Output: S∗ = [r, p1, p2, p3, s1, b1, s2, b2], L∗
special treatment of the first line;
for i = 1 to S do
choose a start point S1 ∈ S;
for n = 1 to N do
C∗ = fM(r, p1, p2, p3,Dn);
x∗1 = c
∗
1/e;
x∗2 = c
∗
1/e;
α1 = [
bi
2
+ (1− bi)x∗1](s− 1);
β1 = [1− bi2 − (1− bi)x∗1](s− 1);
α2 = [
bi
2
+ (1− bi)x∗2](s− 1);
β2 = [1− bi2 − (1− bi)x∗2](s− 1);
[c1, c2] = C
n;
lx1 = f
b( c1−0.5
e
, α1, β1)− f b( c1−0.5e , α1, β1);
lx2 = f
b( c2−0.5
e
, α2, β2)− f b( c2−0.5e , α2, β2);
ln = lx1lx2 ;
end
Li =
∑N log(ln);
choose the next point that Si+1 ∈ S;
end
Find L∗i = max{L};
[r, p1, p2, p3, s1, b1, s2, b2] = Si;
Table 2.8: Estimated Preference Parameters
Parameters Total number
EU p1, p2, r 3
MV p1, p2, r 3
MEU p
1
, p
2
, p
3
, r 4
α-MEU p
1
, p
2
, p
3
, r, α 5
SF w 1
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For the lower bounds on the probabilities we have
p1 + p2 + p3 ≤ 1
For the risk parameter, we let r > 0 as we assume risk aversion. For the bias
parameter we have 0 < b1 < 1, 0 < b2 < 1. And for the precision we have
s1 > 1 and s2 > 1. The parameter space S is the set that satisfies all these
constraints. For any S, we calculate the theoretical optimal C∗ first. By
denoting fM as Algorithm 3 on Page 53, we can calculate the MEU optimal
allocation for problem i ∈ N+65.
C∗ = fM(r, p1, p2, p3,D, e) (2.32)
here D is the return table and e is the cash endowment for the problem i.
We repeat this step for ∀i ∈ N+65. Then we read the actual portfolio choice
of each problem for one subject and calculate the sum of the log-likelihoods
use equation (2.19). We then search for S∗ that maximises the sum of the
log-likelihoods. Algorithm 6 on Page 105 summarises the method.
2.3.5 Preference Theory Comparison Results
Within one error specification, we compare the performance of nested pref-
erences theories using the Likelihood Ratio Test (LRT), which is a statistical
method for testing two nested models. Denote L0 as the sum of the log-
likelihoods of the null model and L1 as the sum of log-likelihoods of the
alternative model, we have the test statistic
T = −2((L1)− (L0))
The test statistic has a Chi-square distribution with degrees of freedom equal
to the difference in the number of parameters in these two models. We
have EU nested in MEU, and MEU nested in α-MEU. MEU has one more
parameter than EU and α-MEU has one more parameter than MEU and
α-MEU has two more parameter than EU. So the corresponding degrees of
freedom are 1, 1 and 2. We have 77 subjects, so we compare each subject’s
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Table 2.9: Likelihood Ratio Test Result comparing EU, MEU and α-
MEU
A : Five percentage significance level
BBB BB
MEU v EU 21 (27%) 14 (18%)
α-MEU v MEU 10 (12%) ∼
α-MEU v EU 17 (22%) ∼
α-MEU+MEU v EU 23 (32%) ∼
B : One percentage significance level
BBB BB
MEU v EU 19 (25%) 13 (17%)
α-MEU v MEU 9 (12%) ∼
α-MEU v EU 14 (18%) ∼
α-MEU+MEU v EU 20 (26%) ∼
sum of log-likelihoods and calculate the test statistic. For a 5% significance
level test, the p-values for Chi square test at 1 and 2 degree of freedom are
3.84 and 5.99. For a 1% significance level test, the p-values for Chi square
test at 1 and 2 degree of freedom are 6.63 and 9.21. In the BB specification,
we have not fitted α-MEU using the data, so we only test MEU against EU.
The results are summarised in Table 2.9 on Page 107. In each entry, the
first number is the number of subjects for who the fit is significantly better,
while the second number is its percentage out of the 77 subjects. It seems
that neither MEU nor α-MEU are particularly better than EU if we consider
the percentages of the subjects. But as we analyse the data individually, we
may want to interpret that result as that most subjects seems to have EU
preferences and a small proportion of subjects are sophisticated enough to
have MEU and α-MEU preferences. At the five percentage significance level,
15 subjects are significantly better both in MEU and α-MEU, which means
there are 21 + 17− 15 = 23 (32%) in total subjects are significantly better
explained by ambiguity preference. This number at the one percentage level
is 20 (26%). It means one third of the total subjects seem to have multiple
priors.
We compare the performance of non-nested theories using the Clarke Test
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(Clarke 2007) 19. The Clarke test is a distribution-free test used for comparing
non-nested models. For example, if we compare the EU with SF, the null
hypothesis is
H0 : P (L1 − L2 > 0) = 0.5
here L1 denotes the individual log-likelihood (the log-likelihood of each 65
problems, which is calculated by the estimated parameters) of EU and L2
denotes the log-likelihood of SF. The test statistic is the
T =
65∑
i
Ii(L1 − L2) (2.33)
here
Ii =
1, L1 − L2 > 00, L1 − L2 ≤ 0
The test statistic is T ∼ Bin(65, 0.5). Under a 5% significance level, the
condition (for an upper tail test) of rejecting the null hypothesis is T ≥ 40.
For example, if for one subject, T = 42 > 40, then we can reject the null
hypothesis. We say EU is significantly ‘better” than SF at 5% significance
level. Table 2.10 on Page 109 summarise the tests results. Notice we have
not corrected the log-likelihood using the number of parameters. From Table
2.10, EU, MEU and α-MEU seem to fit better than SF for the majority of
the subjects, though they do have more parameters than SF (See Table 2.8
on Page 105). EU and MEU seems to fit better than MV. It is not surprising
to get this result considering we only have three states for the ambiguous
assets. d’Acremont and Bossaerts (2008) suggest Mean Variance preferences
are more likely to be adopted by the human brain when the number of states
is increasing.
19In the paper, Clarke suggests correcting the test statistic by adding a factor of the
number of parameters of the two competing models. We think it is vicious. If we do so,
the individual corrected log-likelihoods of SF are always bigger than those of the other
theories as it has only 1 preference parameter.
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Table 2.10: Clarke Test Result
Comparison between SF and EU, MEU α-MEU
EU v SF MEU v SF α-MEU v SF
EU  SF SF  EU MEU  SF SF  MEU α-MEUSF SF α-MEU
55% 8% 56% 10% 58% 4%
Comparison between MV and EU, MEU, α-MEU
EU v MV MEUv MV α-MEU v MV
EU  MV MV  EU MEU  MV MV MEU α-MEUMV MVα-MEU
42% 19% 49% 7% ∼ ∼
2.3.6 Estimation Results concerning beliefs about prob-
abilities
Even though the subjects do not know the exact number of balls of each
colour, the results suggest that they on average do a good job of guessing
the true values but there is considerable variation. We put 15 pink balls, 30
green balls and 15 blue balls into the Bingo Blower, so the corresponding
probabilities are 0.25, 0.5 and 0.25. Figure B.1 on page 116 shows the
histogram of the three estimated probabilities in the EU (BBB) estimation.
On average, the estimated probabilities for each colour in the same order are
0.28, 0.49 and 0.23. Figure B.6 on page 121 shows the estimation results
for the lower bounds of probabilities in the three states in the MEU(BBB)
estimation. Figure B.7 on page 122 shows the estimation results for the sum
of the lower bounds of probabilities in the MEU (BBB) estimation. Figure
B.8 on page 123 shows the estimation results for probabilities in three states
in the MV (BB). The average estimated probabilities for the three colours
are 0.26 0.50 and 0.24, which are even better than EU (BB) in terms of the
closeness to the true probabilities. Table 2.11 A on Page 110 summarises
the estimation results on the (lower bounds of the) probabilities in the BBB
specification. In the BB specification, the results are quite close as in the
BBB specification except the there is a divergence in EU preferences. Table
2.11 B on Page 110 summarise the estimation results on the (lower bounds
of the) probabilities in the BB specification. It is interesting to find that even
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Table 2.11: Estimation Results of Priors
A : BBB specification
Pink(0.25) Green(0.5) Blue(0.25) sum
EU 0.29 0.52 0.19 1
MEU 0.24 0.46 0.18 0.88
α-MEU 0.22 0.45 0.10 0.77
MV 0.26 0.50 0.24 1
B : BB specification
Pink(0.25) Green(0.5) Blue(0.25) sum
EU 0.28 0.49 0.23 1
MEU 0.25 0.47 0.17 0.89
MV 0.26 0.50 0.24 1
though there is a big disparity among the subjects of the estimation of the
lower bounds, on average they guess the probabilities quite well. This is also
a big disparity among the subjects concerning the sum of the three lower
bounds as shown in Figure B.4 on Page 119 and B.7 on Page 122.
2.3.7 Conclusion
In this section, we fit different preference theories to the experiment data.
The statistics suggests that multiple priors preferences (MEU and α-MEU)
fit better than EU for one third of the subjects. Subjects have heterogeneous
beliefs about the (lower bounds of the) probabilities but on average do a job
at guessing the probabilities. EU and MEU fit significantly better than MV
in the majority of subjects. EU, MEU, α-MEU seems to fit better than SF
if we do not consider the number of parameters.
Appendix
A Experimental Instruction
There are the Instructions given to the subjects in the experiment.
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 Instructions 
 
Preamble 
Welcome to this experiment. Thank you for coming. These instructions are to help you to understand 
what the experiment is about and what you are being asked to do during it. The experiment gives you 
the chance to earn money, which will be paid to you in cash after you have completed the experiment. 
The payments described below are in addition to a participation fee of £2.50 that you will be paid 
independently of your answers. 
The Bingo Blower 
At the back of this laboratory you will see a Bingo Blower. You can inspect the Blower at any time that 
you want.  At the front you will see the projections of the Bingo Blower.  In it, as you will see, there are 
balls of three different colours – Pink, Green and Blue – which are being blown around inside the 
Blower. After you have responded to the various problems in the experiment, you will go to the Bingo 
Blower and you will activate a mechanism which will expel one ball from the Bingo Blower. The colour of 
this one ball, combined with your answer to a randomly chosen one of the problems during the 
experiment, will determine your payment for taking part in this experiment – as we describe below.  
Payment 
At the end of the experiment, one of the 65 problems will be picked at random by your picking at 
random a lottery ticket from a set of such tickets numbered from 1 to 65. We will then look at what you 
did on that problem (your allocation to Asset 1, your allocation to Asset 2 and your experimental money 
remaining). You will then go to the Bingo Blower and you will eject one ball. The colour of that ball will 
determine your payment, because it will determine the payments on the two assets. You will be paid in 
cash and then we will ask you to sign a receipt and to confirm that you participated voluntarily in this 
experiment. Then you will be free to go. 
 
The Problems 
This experiment is a simulated investment game. The experiment consists of 65 different problems. In 
each problem, you will be endowed with 100 units of experimental money, and you can use it to buy 
two assets. The price of each asset is 1 unit of experimental money. You do not need to spend all of your 
endowment on the assets, and you cannot borrow any experimental money to buy the assets. Any 
experimental money not allocated to the two assets will remain as experimental money. We call an 
allocation of your 100-unit endowment of experimental money between the two assets and 
experimental money a portfolio decision. The computer software will tell you for any given portfolio 
decision the payoff you would get for each of the three colours.  
There are three different possible states (Pink, Green, and Blue) that could happen and each of the 
states gives a payoff to each asset. For each problem, the possible payoffs for the two assets are 
different. You will get this information in a payoff table when you start each problem. An example is 
given here: 
 Pink Green Blue 
Asset 1 1.2 0.6 1.6 
Asset 2 0.5 1.3 1.4 
 
The colour will be decided by one draw from the Bingo Blower – as we have described. If the payoff 
table for the randomly selected problem is that above, then for every unit of Asset 1 that you bought in 
that problem you will be given 1.2 units of experimental money if the ball drawn is Pink, 0.6 units if the 
ball drawn is Green and 1.6 units if the ball drawn is Blue; similarly for every unit of Asset 2 that you 
bought in that problem you will be given 0.5 units of experimental money if the ball drawn is Pink, 1.3 
units if the ball drawn is Green and 1.4 units if the ball drawn is Blue. As we have already said any units 
of experimental money that you kept in that problem will remain as experimental money.  
Continuing with the example above, if your portfolio decision in this problem was to buy 40 units of 
Asset 1 and 30 units of Asset 2 (thus keeping 30 units of experimental money as experimental money) 
then you would end up with 93 ( = 40*1.2 + 30*0.5 + 30) units of experimental money if a Pink ball is 
drawn, 93 ( = 40*0.6 + 30*1.3 + 30) if a Green ball is drawn and 136 ( = 40*1.6 + 30*1.4 + 30) if an Blue 
ball is drawn: 
Pink Green Blue 
93 93 136 
 
If instead you had decided to buy 60 units of Asset 1 and 40 units of Asset 2 (thus having no units of 
experimental money left) then you would end up with 92 ( = 60*1.2 + 40*0.5 + 0) units of experimental 
money if a Pink ball is drawn, 88 ( = 60*0.6 + 40*1.3 + 0) if a Green ball is drawn and 152 ( = 60*1.6 + 
40*1.4 + 0) if an Blue ball is drawn. Notice that you do not need to calculate these payoffs as the 
computer will tell you the payoffs for each of the three states. The experimental money that you end up 
with will be converted into real money (which you will be paid in addition to the £2.50 show-up fee) at 
the rate of 12 units of experimental money equal to £1 in real money. 
How you express your desired purchases 
When you start each problem you will see a triangle with red sides on the screen. When you move the 
cursor into the screen you will see that each particular point in the triangle represents an allocation of 
your 100-unit endowment of experimental money to the two assets and to residual experimental 
money. This will be written alongside the triangle. The horizontal distance from the left hand side 
indicates the number of units of Asset 1; the vertical distance from the bottom indicates the number of 
units of Asset 2; the residual amount of experimental money is written beside the triangle. You can see a 
Portfolio Table on the screen that shows the amounts for two assets and experimental money when you 
move your cursor inside the triangle. For example, if you put the cursor at the bottom corner of the 
triangle (actually the mouse cursor is always starting at this point which represents your initial 
situation), this represents buying zero of both assets: the bottom-right hand corner represents spending 
all the endowment on Asset 1; the top-left hand corner represents spending all the endowment on 
Asset 2; and the middle of the triangle represents spending one-third of your endowment on Asset 1, 
one-third on Asset 2 and keeping one-third in the form of experimental money.  Move the cursor around 
until you see your desired allocation. Then double click with your mouse to make this choice. You 
will be asked to confirm your decision, though you can change it if you wish by clicking on ‘No’. 
How Long the Experiment Will Last 
Because it is in your interest to consider the problems carefully, we are imposing a minimum time of 30 seconds 
for your answer on any problem; you cannot go onto the next problem until these 30 seconds have elapsed. We 
are also imposing a maximum time of 180 seconds; if you do not answer and confirm you decision in these 180 
seconds, we will assume that your allocation to each of the two assets is zero. 
We estimate that the experiment will take at least 60 minutes of your time. You can take longer and it is clearly in 
your interests to be as careful as you can when you are answering the questions.  
Enrica Carbone 
Xueqi Dong 
John Hey 
May 2013 
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Figure B.1: Estimated probabilities for EU(BBB)
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Figure B.2: Estimated lower bound of probabilities for MEU(BBB)
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Figure B.3: Estimated lower bound of probabilities for α-MEU(BBB)
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Figure B.4: Estimated sum of lower bound for MEU(BBB) and α-
MEU(BBB)
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Figure B.5: Estimated probabilities for EU(BB)
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Figure B.6: Estimated lower bound of probabilities for MEU(BB)
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Figure B.7: Estimated sum of lower bound of probabilities for
MEU(BB)
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Figure B.8: Estimated lower bound of probabilities for MV(BB)
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Chapter 3
Error Stories and the Estimation
of Preference Functionals using
3-Way Allocation Data
1
3.1 Introduction
Experimentalists are increasingly using allocation problems to make infer-
ences about subjects’ preferences – the reason being that allocation prob-
lems appear more informative than other types of problems - such as pairwise
choices, Holt-Laury price lists and the Becker-DeGroot-Marschak mechanism.
At the same time some experimentalists are broadening the type of alloca-
tion problem, moving from allocations over just two events to allocations
over more than two, again to get more information from experiments. Even
with just two allocations, the issue of the error process is already interesting;
going to allocations over more than two increases the interest as well as the
1This chapter is joint written with John Hey as a result of join research. It is an on
going project.
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complexity of the problem. This paper examines some of the various possi-
bilities and solutions. It also carries out a simulation exercise to investigate
the problems caused by using the wrong stochastic specification.
3.2 The decision Problem
Consider a 3-way allocation problem, in which subjects are asked, in a se-
ries of problems (one of which will be randomly selected at the end of the
experiment to determine the subject’s payment) to allocate a given quantity
of tokens between three risky events, with given exchange rates between to-
kens and money for each state, and with given probabilities for each state.
Denote by m the quantity of tokens to allocate, by e1, e2 and e3 the three
exchange rates, and by p1, p2 and p3 the three probabilities. Let x1, x2 and
x3 denote the three allocations (where x1 +x2 +x3 = m), then, assuming an
Expected Utility maximiser, the subject’s decision is to choose the allocations
to maximise p1u(e1x1) + p2u(e2x2) + p3u(e3x3) subject to the constraint.
The first-order conditions are pieiu
′(eix∗i ) = λ, for i = 1, 2, 3, where λ is
the Lagrangian multiplier and the asterisk denotes the optimal allocation.
After making all the allocations, one of the problems is chosen at random, a
random device is invoked (with the specified probabilities for that problem)
and the subject paid the money equivalent (given the exchange rates of that
problem) of the number of tokens allocated to that state by that subject.
From the experiment are obtained observations of the allocations that sub-
jects actually made. These observations will be used to infer the preference
functions of the subjects. Specifically it might be the case that is desired to
infer whether these preferences are CARA (Constant Absolute Risk Averse)
or CRRA (Constant Relative Risk Averse); it also desired to infer their de-
gree of risk aversion. This latter is captured by the parameter r of the utility
function. The two functions are as follows:
CARA u(w) =

−e−rx r > 0
x r = 0
e−rx r < 0
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here if r is positive, zero, negative, then the individual is risk-averse, risk-
neutral, risk-loving.
CRRA u(w) =

xr r > 0
ln(x) r = 0
−xr r < 0
here if r is less than, equal to or larger than 1, then the individual is risk-
averse, risk-neutral, risk-loving. For either preference functional and for any
value of the parameter r we can find the optimal unconstrained allocations.
These are specified in Appendix C on Page 138. It will be seen there that with
the CARA specification there is a problem in that the optimal unconstrained
allocations may be negative or may exceed the amount to be allocated.
Clearly in an experiment we cannot allow subjects to make allocations such
that they may lose money as a consequence. So we have to tell the subjects
that they cannot make negative allocations: they will be implementing their
optimal constrained allocations. That is what will be observed. Again details
are given in Appendix C. These problems do not arise with the CRRA spec-
ification as the optimal unconstrained allocations necessarily strictly satisfy
the non-negativity constraints, as Appendix C makes clear.
3.3 Error Specifications
Now we come to the meat of the chapter – the stochastic specification. It
is clear that subjects make mistakes when taking their decisions, and do not
precisely implement the optimal (constrained or unconstrained as appropri-
ate) allocations. Their actual allocations depart from these in some way.
We need an error story for our estimation (which will be by means of Max-
imum Likelihood estimation). The stochastic assumptions underlying this
estimation embody a story about the error process.
The reader should be warned that there is a lot of technical detail in what
follows, but it is important. We want to somehow capture the process fol-
lowed by the subjects in arriving at their actual allocations - to try and get
127
inside their minds. What we presume, in keeping with all tests of economic
theories, is that subjects do have some preference functional (which we are
assuming is deterministic, so we are excluding random preference stories in
what follows), and that they try and optimise it. We assume that subjects
calculate their (constrained) optimal allocations with error - so that the error
is ‘added into’ the actual (constrained) allocations. We note that in most
experiments subjects are usually restricted to discrete allocations, so that the
data we have is discrete, and it is an interesting question as to whether sub-
jects do this discretisation before or after errors are ’added’. In what follows
we assume that subjects first arrive at continuous allocations with error and
then discretise them. Different error stories2 would be needed if subjects first
discretise their optimal (constrained) allocations before the error is ‘added
in’.
We presume that these errors are built ‘on top of’ the optimal constrained
allocations, rather than on the optimal unconstrained allocations3. In this
context one cannot do as many people do – just add on a normally dis-
tributed error term to the optimal allocations to get the actual allocations –
because the implied actual allocations might then violate the non-negativity
constraints. However, we can use the fact that the optimal (constrained if
necessary) allocations must lie between 0 and m (the amount to be allo-
cated). So the proportions x∗i /m must lie between 0 and 1. This suggests
one obvious error story: that the actual proportions xi/m have beta distri-
butions centred on the optimal allocations x∗i /m. The way to achieve this
has been used by Hey and Pace (2014). If we take xi/m to have a beta
2Obvious contenders here are a beta-binomial distribution, a beta-binomial with bias
(the meaning of which will become clearer later) and a two-beta-binomial (again the
meaning of which will become clearer later).
3It is difficult to conceive of subjects making errors in their unconstrained allocations
and then somehow adding error into them.
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distribution4 with parametersαi = x∗i (si − 1)/mβi = (m− x∗i )(si − 1)/m (3.1)
then the mean of xi/m is x
∗
i /m and its variance is x
∗
i (m− x∗i )/(m2si), and
hence it follows that the mean of xi is x
∗
i and its variance is x
∗
i (m− x∗i )/si.
There is no bias in the allocations. Here the parameter si is an indicator
of the precision of the subject in taking decisions – the higher the more
precise. Note also that this variance expression implies that the spread of
the distribution of xi is smaller the closer that x
∗
i is to its bounds; this seems
a natural behavioural assumption: subjects make smaller errors towards the
bounds.
But we have three allocations. We can ignore one as they must add up to
m. Let us concentrate on allocations 1 and 2. The above method works for
each of the other two individually, but, if we apply it to two of them at the
same time, there is no guarantee that x1 + x2 ≤ m. If this is not true it
would imply that x3 < 0, which is not allowed by the rules of the experiment.
There are two ways to proceed at this point: first, one can simply ignore the
cases in which x1 + x2 > m; second, one can devise an error story for which
it is guaranteed that x1 + x2 ≤ m. This latter is what we do here. To do
this, we use the fact given x1, x2 needs to lie between 0 and m− x1. So let
us first assume that x1/m has a beta distribution with parametersα1 = x∗1(s1 − 1)/mβ1 = (m− x∗1)(s1 − 1)/m (3.2)
which guarantees that the mean of x1 equals x
∗
1 and its variance equals
x∗i (m − x∗i )/s1; and then assume that x2/(m − x1) has a beta distribution
4A beta distribution with parameters α and β lies in [0,1] and has mean
α
α+ β
and
variance
αβ
(α+ β)2(α+ β + 1)
.
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with parametersα2 = x∗2(s2 − 1)/(m− x∗1)β2 = (m− x∗1 − x∗2)(s2 − 1)/(m− x∗1) (3.3)
This would imply that the mean of x2/(m−x1) would be equal to x∗2/(m−x∗1)
and its variance would be equal to
x∗2(m− x∗1 − x∗2)(s2 − 1)2
(m− x∗1)2(s2 − 1)2s2
=
x∗2(m− x∗1 − x∗2)
(m− x∗1)2s2
;
and hence the mean of x2 is equal to x
∗
2(m−x1)/(m−x∗1) while the variance
of x2 is x
∗
2(m − x∗1 − x∗2)(m − x1)2/[s2(m − x∗1)2]. Note that the nice
properties of the variance are still preserved and that s2 remains a measure
of the precision of the subject 5. It might appear from the result on the mean
of x2 that it is biased – but this is conditional on the value of x1 and it, in
turn, is unbiased, so that the unconditional mean of x2 is indeed equal to x
∗
2.
Behaviourally it seems reasonable to assume that the (distribution of the)
error on x2 depends on x1, which is what the above specification implicitly
assumes and implies. Note that this method guarantees that x1 + x2 ≤ m
and hence that x3 ≥ 0.
This error specification is appropriate for when the preference functional is
CRRA – since the optimal allocations are strictly between 0 and m, and so
the error distributions are not degenerate. When we combine CRRA with
this error specification we will refer to this combination as Specification 1.
However there are problems with this error specification with CARA since the
optimal unconstrained allocations may lie outside this interval and therefore
the optimal constrained allocations may lie on the bounds. It will be clear
from the above that if x∗i is equal to either 0 or m then the variance of xi is
zero and its distribution is degenerate at the bound. Implicitly this specifica-
tion implies that subjects do not make mistakes at the bounds. So this model
cannot rationalise any observation inside the bounds in the cases where the
optimal constrained allocation is at a bound. We suspect that subjects may
5In what follows we will put s1 = s2 as there seems to be no reason why subjects
should be more precise on one state than on the other.
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still make errors even at the bounds, and, to cover such case, propose the
following two specifications. We note that one important criterion is that
the sum of the three actual allocations must be m.
Specification 2 ‘beta with bias’
Here we assume a beta distribution as above but with bias. We define
variables x′i = bim/3 + (1− bi)x∗i and replace x∗i in the above with x′i. Here
the parameters bi are bias parameters. If bi = 0 then there is no bias; but if
bi > 0 there is bias, which depends upon the value of x
∗
i . If x
∗
i = m/3 once
again there is no bias, so the bias increases away from the equal division. We
note that here, even if the value of x∗i is at a bound the distributions of the
xi are not degenerate, so we may observe a non-zero actual allocation even
though the optimal allocation is zero.
Specification 3 ‘two betas’
In this we continue to use Specification 1 when the optimal allocation is
within the bounds, but we add in a special case - when the x∗i is 0 (or m).
When x∗i is 0 we assume that the actual allocation is beta with parameters
1 and d so that xi has mean 1/(1 + d) and variance d/[(1 + d)
2(d + 2)].
When x∗i is 1 we assume that the actual allocation is beta with parameters d
and 1 so that xi has mean d/(1 + d) and variance d/[(1 + d)
2(d+ 2)]. But
we also need to take into account the fact that the actual allocations sum
to m. There are various cases that we need to consider:
• If all of the x∗i are positive, then we do as in Specification 1.
• If one of the x∗i is m (and hence the other two are zero), then we
generate the corresponding xi as Beta(1, d); this will be less than m,
and we make the other two allocations equal to half of (m− xi).
• If one of the x∗i is zero and the other two positive, we have three cases.
Let us take just one of them – when x∗1 = 0, x
∗
2 > 0 and x
∗
3 > 0 –
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the other two cases are treated symmetrically. In this case we make
the actual allocation x1 to be beta with parameters 1 and d, and then
make the allocation x2/(m− x1) to be beta with parametersα2 = x∗2(s2 − 1)/(m− x∗1)β2 = (m− x∗1 − x∗2)(s2 − 1)/(m− x∗1) (3.4)
This guarantees that x1 + x2 ≤ m.
3.4 A simulation study
Some econometricians who analyse experimental data – particularly Wilcox
(2008) – feel that the error specification may be more important than the
preference functional. Wilcox has extensively investigated and compared dif-
ferent error stories in the context of an experiment involving pairwise choices.
To see whether his results – which show that the error specification is a cru-
cial decision variable for the experimenter – carry over to our (allocation)
context, we report on simulation results that we have generated.
The simulation was conducted as follows We have the three stochastic spec-
ifications described above. We examine the estimation results obtained from
the 9 pairwise combinations of the three true error specifications with the
three assumed-true (estimated) specifications. This will enable us to see if
the inferences drawn are very different if we use the wrong stochastic spec-
ification. Clearly the results from any such simulation may be sensitive to
the underlying parameters, so the simulations have been carried out with a
number of different parameter sets. These parameters are those relating to
the preferences of the subjects and the precision and bias in their responses.
The preferences we take to be either CRRA or CARA with risk aversion index
denoted by r in both cases. The implied utility functions that we use are
those stated above.
In the simulation we normalise by putting the value of m equal to 1, so that
these functions span the range from 0 to 1. For a CRRA subject, a value of
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r greater or equal to 1 indicates a subject who is risk-loving or risk-neutral;
for such subjects their optimal decision is simple – to allocate everything to
the state i for which piei is the greatest. Clearly we are not going to get any
information about their value of r if it is greater than 1. For a CRRA person
the value r can be zero or negative, in which cases the function takes different
forms. We restrict attention to positive values of r (between 0 and 1) as
this covers a range of reasonably risk-averse subjects. Those with negative
values of r are very risk-averse. For CARA subjects, roughly the same range
of risk attitudes is captured by letting r range from 1 to 5, though one cannot
strictly compare the risk attitudes of the two types of subjects. For a CARA
person the value of r can be zero or negative, in which cases once again the
function takes different forms. If r is zero the subject is risk-neutral and if
r is negative the subject is risk-loving; once again we would not be able to
discriminate between different degrees of risk-loving. Note that with CRRA
an increase in r implies less risk-aversion while for CARA an increase in r
implies more risk-aversion. Our sets of parameters are listed in Table D.1
on Page 141 . There are 10 different parameter sets in two blocks of 5: the
same set of risk-aversion parameters are in the two blocks and the blocks
differ in their precision – the amount of noise in behaviour – the second block
is more precise. Within a block risk-aversion increases throughout the block
for both CRRA and CARA. Although, as we have already noted, there is no
strict mapping between a value of r for a CRRA subject and the value of r for
a CARA subject, we have chosen the parameter values so that the highest
value of r for the CRRA subjects implies roughly the same (low) amount of
risk-aversion (concavity) as the lowest value of r for the CARA subjects, and
so that the lowest value of r for the CRRA subjects implies roughly the same
(high) amount of risk-aversion (concavity) as the highest value of r for the
CARA subjects. Figure 3.1 shows the implied utility functions for both the
least risk-averse and the most risk-averse simulated subjects for both CRRA
and CARA; Table 3.1 is a rough mapping between a value of r for a CRRA
subject and the value of r for a CARA subject, though we should emphasise
that the mapping is not precise.
We ran the simulations on 72 different allocation problems (combinations of
p1, p2, p3, e1, e2 and e3). These are listed in Table D.2 on Page 142. As
133
Figure 3.1: The utility functions implied by the lowest and highest risk
aversion indices
CRRA with r = 0.9 (low
risk-aversion)
CRRA with r = 0.1 (high
risk-aversion)
CARA with r = 1 (low risk-
aversion)
CARA with r=5 (high risk-
aversion)
CRRA r CARA r
0.9 1
0.7 2
0.5 3
0.3 4
0.1 5
Table 3.1: Rough mapping from CRRA r to CARA r
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will be seen there is a range of possible values for all of these. We assume
that all states are treated equally, given their probabilities, and hence that
there is no psychological bias towards or away from particular states6. The
set of problems was chosen to span as much of the state space as possible,
so we might expect a variety of behaviours from different subjects7. Mirror-
ing what is done in experiments, we restricted the number of decimal places
in the stated allocations to 2 – exactly as if the total number of tokens to
allocate was 100 and subjects had to choose integer allocations. This has an
effect, as we will see, on the inferences drawn. A total of 10008 simulations
was implemented; the means and the standard deviations of the estimated
parameters r and s, (for all three Specifications), b (for Specification 2) and
d (for Specification 3) are presented in Table D.3 through Table D.6 from
Page 143 to Page 146 with the standard deviation in italics under the corre-
sponding mean. These tables are arranged in 10 blocks, each corresponding
to a particular one of the 10 parameter sets. The means and standard de-
viations of the maximised log-likelihood are presented in Table D.7 on Page
147, with, again, the standard deviations are in italics. We should note that
no specification is nested inside any other. It might look on the surface the
Specification 2 is nested inside Specification 1 when b = 0, but the for-
mer specification involves CARA preferences while the latter involves CRRA
preferences. Similarly it might look as if Specification 3 is nested inside Spec-
ification 1 when d = ∞, but, once again, the former specification involves
CARA preferences while the latter involves CRRA preferences. We begin by
looking at Table D.3, which reports the means and standard deviations of
the risk-aversion parameter r. Looking down the main diagonal of each block
we see that everywhere the mean estimated parameter is close to the true
value – as one would expect: if one uses the correct specification one should
recover the true preferences, though the CRRA estimated values seem to be
closer to the true values than the CARA estimated values9. However it is the
off-diagonal elements that are most interesting and informative as these tell
6Perhaps because of their representation.
7Actually one of the purposes of this simulation exercise was to enable us to choose a
‘good’ problem set for use in a future experiment.
8Matlab was used for the simulations; the program is available on request.
9Though it seems to be never the case that the mean r value are significantly different
at 1% from their true values.
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Figure 3.2: An example of mis-specification
CRRA with r = 0.9 (low
risk-aversion)
CRRA with r = 0.1 (high
risk-aversion)
us about the dangers of misspecification10. Care must be exercised however,
since the r for CRRA means something different from an r for CARA. For
example, look at Parameter set 1 (the first block) when the true specification
is CRRA with r = 0.9 and when specification 2 is used for estimation, the
mean estimated value of r is 0.634. Figure 3.2 on Page 135 illustrates (where
the true model is CRRA with r = 0.5 and the estimated model is CARA un-
der Specification 2 (where the mean estimated CARA is 1.948)); while one
cannot say that the two functions are the same, they are similar. The same is
true elsewhere. Precisions, however, are comparable; examine Table D.4 on
Page 144. Again along the main diagonal of each block the mean estimated
precision is close to the true precision, though the standard errors are quite
large. This latter is a consequence of the likelihood function being rather
flat along towards its minimum, indicating that differences in precision do
not make a big difference to behaviour. The off-diagonal elements, however,
do depart quite sharply from the true values. As a general rule, though it is
not always the case, the estimated precision is less than the true precision.
This is an interesting result which suggests that mis-specification might lead
to an under-estimation of the precision of the subjects. The results for the
10Note that in some cases the mean estimate of r is 0.01 (and the standard error is 0);
these are cases when the estimate hit its lowest bound (specified as 0.01) in all simulations;
this lower bound was there to stop the software crashing if s reached zero. Perhaps a
lower lower-bound might have been appropriate.
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bias b parameter in Table D.5 on Page 145 are interesting. This is appro-
priate only when the estimated specification is Specification 2. When the
true specification is Specification 1 the estimates of b are close to their true
values but occasionally depart significantly from them. When the true value
of b is zero, the estimated values are not significantly different from zero.
The estimates of the d parameter in Specification 3 appear reasonable as
Table D.6 on Page 146 shows. This is appropriate only when the estimated
specification is Specification 3. It is it interesting to note, however, that
for the parameter sets with higher risk aversion, the estimated values of d
for true Specification 1 are ’well below’ (if that means anything) their true
value of ∞. Finally we examine Table D.7 which reports the means and
standard deviations of the minimised negative log-likelihoods. We feel that
these log-likelihoods are comparable across specifications. What we had ex-
pected was that the entries down the main diagonal of each block would
be the smallest in each row (remember that these numbers are the negative
of the minimised log-likelihood) – indicating that if one chooses between
specifications on the basis of the maximised log-likelihoods, then one would
always correctly identify the true specification. But that is not true. Take
the rows where Specification 1 is the true specification. Everywhere Specifi-
cation 3 has the lowest (negative) log-likelihood; it is almost the same when
Specification 2 is the true specification. There appears to be a systematic
bias: experimentalists could be wrongly led to believe that Specification 3 is
the true specification even when it is not. This is rather worrying. But the
reasons are clear and it is to do with our recurring issue about the bounds on
the optimal allocations. It is also to do with the fact that actual allocations
were rounded to two decimal places11. Examine Table D.8 on Page 148.
This displays the optimal allocations for CRRA and CARA – in the first 6
columns to 7 decimal places and in the last 6 columns to just 2. Of particular
importance are the ’0’s and ’1’s. It will be noted that, to 7 decimal places,
where there is a ’0’ in the CARA columns, there is (but this is just to 7 dec-
imal places) a positive number in the CRRA columns; similarly where there
is a ’1’ in the CARA columns there is (but this is just to 7 decimal places)
11The reason for that, as we have mentioned before, is that in experiments subjects
are not allowed to express allocations to any number of decimal places, and usually, for
example, when the amount to allocate is 100, they are restricted to integer allocations.
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a number less than 1 in the CRRA columns. However when the number of
decimal places is cut to 2, there are usually ’0’s and ’1’s in the same place.
As a consequence the estimation procedure gets confused as to whether the
true preferences are CRRA or CARA. In addition, Specification 3 tells a nice
story about what happens at the bounds – a story different from that told
elsewhere.
3.5 Conclusions
The messages that this study suggest are negative in some ways and pos-
itive in others, though this depends on your perspective. If you are solely
interested in getting an idea as to the magnitude of the risk-aversion of the
subjects, then the message seems to be that the specification is relatively
unimportant. If, however, you are interested in the precision of the subjects,
then it would appear that the specification is important – getting it wrong
can lead to systematic under-estimates of the precision. One might also get
wrong the bias of the subjects. But the really negative, and surprising, result
is that choosing the ‘best’ specification on the basis of the best log-likelihood
can seriously lead you astray. But if you are only interested in estimates of
risk-aversion, it might not matter. Perhaps there is a moral here – if ex-
perimentalists are really concerned about deciding whether preferences are
CRRA or CARA, they ought to let subjects express their allocations to more
decimal places.
Appendix
C The optimal allocations
CARA
Unconstrained
x∗1 = {rme2e3 − e2ln(p3e3/p1e1)− e3ln(p2e2/p1e1)}/d1
x∗2 = {rme3e1 − e2ln(p3e3/p2e2)− e3ln(p1e1/p2e2)}/d1
x∗3 = {rme1e2 − e2ln(p1e1/p3e3)− e1ln(p2e2/p3e3)}/d1
where d1 = r(e2e3 + e3e1 + e1e2.
Constrained 1
x∗1 = 0
x∗2 = {rme3 − ln(p3e3/p2e2)}/d2
x∗3 = {rme2 − ln(p2e2/p3e3)}/d2
where d2 = r(e2 + e3).
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Constrained 2
x∗1 = {rme3 − ln(p3e3/p1e1)}/d3
x∗2 = 0
x∗3 = {rme1 − ln(p1e1/p3e3)}/d3
where d3 = r(e1 + e3).
Constrained 3
x∗1 = {rme2 − ln(p2e2/p1e1)}/d4
x∗2 = {rme1 − ln(p1e1/p2e2)}/d4
x∗3 = 0
where d4 = r(e1 + e2).
Constrained 4
x∗1 = 0
x∗2 = 0
x∗3 = m
Constrained 5
x∗1 = 0
x∗2 = m
x∗3 = 0
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Constrained 6
x∗1 = m
x∗2 = 0
x∗3 = 0
If the unconstrained solution violates the non-negativity constraints we need
to check the six constrained allocations and choose the optimal which is the
one that satisfies the constraints and yields the maximum expected utility.
CRRA
x∗1 = m(p1e1)
1/(1+r)e2e3/d
x∗2 = m(p2e2)
1/(1+r)e3e1/d
x∗3 = m(p3e3)
1/(1+r)e1e2/d
where
d = (p1e1)
1/(1+r)e2e3 + (p2e2)
1/(1+r)e3e1 + (p3e3)
1/(1+r)e1e2
141
D Tables for Simulation
This appendix contains the tables of simulation parameters and simulation
results.
Table D.1: The Parameters Sets
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Table D.2: The Problem Sets
 
 
p1 p2 p3 e1 e2 e3 
0.40 0.30 0.30 0.75 0.75 0.75 
0.40 0.40 0.20 0.75 0.75 0.75 
0.50 0.30 0.20 0.75 0.75 0.75 
0.50 0.40 0.10 0.75 0.75 0.75 
0.60 0.20 0.20 0.75 0.75 0.75 
0.60 0.30 0.10 0.75 0.75 0.75 
0.70 0.20 0.10 0.75 0.75 0.75 
0.80 0.10 0.10 0.75 0.75 0.75 
0.40 0.30 0.30 0.75 0.75 1.00 
0.40 0.40 0.20 0.75 0.75 1.00 
0.50 0.30 0.20 0.75 0.75 1.00 
0.50 0.40 0.10 0.75 0.75 1.00 
0.60 0.20 0.20 0.75 0.75 1.00 
0.60 0.30 0.10 0.75 0.75 1.00 
0.70 0.20 0.10 0.75 0.75 1.00 
0.80 0.10 0.10 0.75 0.75 1.00 
0.40 0.30 0.30 0.75 0.75 1.25 
0.40 0.40 0.20 0.75 0.75 1.25 
0.50 0.30 0.20 0.75 0.75 1.25 
0.50 0.40 0.10 0.75 0.75 1.25 
0.60 0.20 0.20 0.75 0.75 1.25 
0.60 0.30 0.10 0.75 0.75 1.25 
0.70 0.20 0.10 0.75 0.75 1.25 
0.80 0.10 0.10 0.75 0.75 1.25 
0.40 0.30 0.30 0.75 1.00 0.75 
0.40 0.40 0.20 0.75 1.00 0.75 
0.50 0.30 0.20 0.75 1.00 0.75 
0.50 0.40 0.10 0.75 1.00 0.75 
0.60 0.20 0.20 0.75 1.00 0.75 
0.60 0.30 0.10 0.75 1.00 0.75 
0.70 0.20 0.10 0.75 1.00 0.75 
0.80 0.10 0.10 0.75 1.00 0.75 
0.40 0.30 0.30 0.75 1.00 1.00 
0.40 0.40 0.20 0.75 1.00 1.00 
0.50 0.30 0.20 0.75 1.00 1.00 
0.50 0.40 0.10 0.75 1.00 1.00 
0.60 0.20 0.20 0.75 1.00 1.00 
0.60 0.30 0.10 0.75 1.00 1.00 
0.70 0.20 0.10 0.75 1.00 1.00 
0.80 0.10 0.10 0.75 1.00 1.00 
0.40 0.30 0.30 0.75 1.00 1.25 
0.40 0.40 0.20 0.75 1.00 1.25 
0.50 0.30 0.20 0.75 1.00 1.25 
0.50 0.40 0.10 0.75 1.00 1.25 
0.60 0.20 0.20 0.75 1.00 1.25 
0.60 0.30 0.10 0.75 1.00 1.25 
0.70 0.20 0.10 0.75 1.00 1.25 
0.80 0.10 0.10 0.75 1.00 1.25 
0.40 0.30 0.30 0.75 1.25 0.75 
0.40 0.40 0.20 0.75 1.25 0.75 
0.50 0.30 0.20 0.75 1.25 0.75 
0.50 0.40 0.10 0.75 1.25 0.75 
0.60 0.20 0.20 0.75 1.25 0.75 
0.60 0.30 0.10 0.75 1.25 0.75 
0.70 0.20 0.10 0.75 1.25 0.75 
0.80 0.10 0.10 0.75 1.25 0.75 
0.40 0.30 0.30 0.75 1.25 1.00 
0.40 0.40 0.20 0.75 1.25 1.00 
0.50 0.30 0.20 0.75 1.25 1.00 
0.50 0.40 0.10 0.75 1.25 1.00 
0.60 0.20 0.20 0.75 1.25 1.00 
0.60 0.30 0.10 0.75 1.25 1.00 
0.70 0.20 0.10 0.75 1.25 1.00 
0.80 0.10 0.10 0.75 1.25 1.00 
0.40 0.30 0.30 0.75 1.25 1.25 
0.40 0.40 0.20 0.75 1.25 1.25 
0.50 0.30 0.20 0.75 1.25 1.25 
0.50 0.40 0.10 0.75 1.25 1.25 
0.60 0.20 0.20 0.75 1.25 1.25 
0.60 0.30 0.10 0.75 1.25 1.25 
0.70 0.20 0.10 0.75 1.25 1.25 
0.80 0.10 0.10 0.75 1.25 1.25 
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Table D.3: Means and standard deviations of the estimated value of
the risk-aversion prametr r
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Table D.4: Means and standard deviations of the estimated value of
the precision parameter s
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Table D.5: Means and standard deviations of the estimated value of
the bias parameter b (note that this is only estimated for specification 2)
*Indicates parameter b is irrelevant
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Table D.6: Means and standard deviations of the estimated value of the
second beta parameter d (note that his is only estimated for specification
3)
*Indicates parameter s is irrelevant
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Table D.7: Means and standard deviations of the maximised log-
likelihoods
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Table D.8: Allocations under CRRA and under CARA for parameter
set 1
 
 
CRRA to 7 decimal places CARA to 7 decimal places CRRA to 2 decimal places CARA to 2 decimal places 
x1* x2* x3* x1* x2* x3* x1* x2* x3* x1* x2* x3* 
0.8987738 0.0506131 0.0506131 0.5890507 0.2054746 0.2054746 0.90 0.05 0.05 0.59 0.21 0.21 
0.4997560 0.4997560 0.0004880 0.5000000 0.5000000 0.0000000 0.50 0.50 0.00 0.50 0.50 0.00 
0.9938861 0.0060096 0.0001042 0.8405504 0.1594496 0.0000000 0.99 0.01 0.00 0.84 0.16 0.00 
0.9030370 0.0969629 0.0000001 0.6487624 0.3512376 0.0000000 0.90 0.10 0.00 0.65 0.35 0.00 
0.9999661 0.0000169 0.0000169 1.0000000 0.0000000 0.0000000 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 
0.9990244 0.0009756 0.0000000 0.9620981 0.0379019 0.0000000 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.96 0.04 0.00 
0.9999964 0.0000036 0.0000000 1.0000000 0.0000000 0.0000000 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 
1.0000000 0.0000000 0.0000000 1.0000000 0.0000000 0.0000000 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 
0.5536138 0.0311759 0.4152103 0.5031186 0.1195425 0.3773389 0.55 0.03 0.42 0.50 0.12 0.38 
0.4967695 0.4967695 0.0064611 0.5000000 0.5000000 0.0000000 0.50 0.50 0.01 0.50 0.50 0.00 
0.9926118 0.0060019 0.0013862 0.8398944 0.1587935 0.0013121 0.99 0.01 0.00 0.84 0.16 0.00 
0.9030360 0.0969628 0.0000012 0.6487624 0.3512376 0.0000000 0.90 0.10 0.00 0.65 0.35 0.00 
0.9997576 0.0000169 0.0002255 1.0000000 0.0000000 0.0000000 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 
0.9990242 0.0009756 0.0000002 0.9620981 0.0379019 0.0000000 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.96 0.04 0.00 
0.9999963 0.0000036 0.0000000 1.0000000 0.0000000 0.0000000 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 
1.0000000 0.0000000 0.0000000 1.0000000 0.0000000 0.0000000 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 
0.1505061 0.0084755 0.8410184 0.4634851 0.0799090 0.4566059 0.15 0.01 0.84 0.46 0.08 0.46 
0.4768937 0.4768937 0.0462126 0.4407143 0.4407143 0.1185713 0.48 0.48 0.05 0.44 0.44 0.12 
0.9838147 0.0059488 0.0102365 0.7713357 0.0902349 0.1384294 0.98 0.01 0.01 0.77 0.09 0.14 
0.9030288 0.0969620 0.0000092 0.6487624 0.3512376 0.0000000 0.90 0.10 0.00 0.65 0.35 0.00 
0.9983055 0.0000169 0.0016776 0.9188933 0.0000000 0.0811067 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.92 0.00 0.08 
0.9990228 0.0009756 0.0000016 0.9620981 0.0379019 0.0000000 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.96 0.04 0.00 
0.9999960 0.0000036 0.0000004 1.0000000 0.0000000 0.0000000 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 
0.9999999 0.0000000 0.0000001 1.0000000 0.0000000 0.0000000 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 
0.5536138 0.4152103 0.0311759 0.5031186 0.3773389 0.1195425 0.55 0.42 0.03 0.50 0.38 0.12 
0.0698360 0.9300958 0.0000682 0.4070388 0.5929612 0.0000000 0.07 0.93 0.00 0.41 0.59 0.00 
0.9253814 0.0745216 0.0000970 0.6989392 0.3010608 0.0000000 0.93 0.07 0.00 0.70 0.30 0.00 
0.4115157 0.5884843 0.0000000 0.5345494 0.4654506 0.0000000 0.41 0.59 0.00 0.53 0.47 0.00 
0.9997576 0.0002255 0.0000169 1.0000000 0.0000000 0.0000000 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 
0.9871608 0.0128392 0.0000000 0.8031229 0.1968771 0.0000000 0.99 0.01 0.00 0.80 0.20 0.00 
0.9999517 0.0000483 0.0000000 1.0000000 0.0000000 0.0000000 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 
1.0000000 0.0000000 0.0000000 1.0000000 0.0000000 0.0000000 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 
0.4000000 0.3000000 0.3000000 0.4000000 0.3000000 0.3000000 0.40 0.30 0.30 0.40 0.30 0.30 
0.0697773 0.9293151 0.0009075 0.4070388 0.5929612 0.0000000 0.07 0.93 0.00 0.41 0.59 0.00 
0.9242766 0.0744326 0.0012908 0.6989392 0.3010608 0.0000000 0.92 0.07 0.00 0.70 0.30 0.00 
0.4115155 0.5884840 0.0000006 0.5345494 0.4654506 0.0000000 0.41 0.59 0.00 0.53 0.47 0.00 
0.9995491 0.0002254 0.0002254 1.0000000 0.0000000 0.0000000 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 
0.9871606 0.0128392 0.0000002 0.8031229 0.1968771 0.0000000 0.99 0.01 0.00 0.80 0.20 0.00 
0.9999517 0.0000483 0.0000000 1.0000000 0.0000000 0.0000000 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 
1.0000000 0.0000000 0.0000000 1.0000000 0.0000000 0.0000000 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 
0.1362781 0.1022086 0.7615133 0.3495682 0.2621761 0.3882557 0.14 0.10 0.76 0.35 0.26 0.39 
0.0693712 0.9239065 0.0067223 0.3651809 0.5615678 0.0732513 0.07 0.92 0.01 0.37 0.56 0.07 
0.9166444 0.0738180 0.0095376 0.6585173 0.2707444 0.0707383 0.92 0.07 0.01 0.66 0.27 0.07 
0.4115140 0.5884819 0.0000042 0.5345494 0.4654506 0.0000000 0.41 0.59 0.00 0.53 0.47 0.00 
0.9980976 0.0002251 0.0016773 0.9188933 0.0000000 0.0811067 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.92 0.00 0.08 
0.9871592 0.0128391 0.0000016 0.8031229 0.1968771 0.0000000 0.99 0.01 0.00 0.80 0.20 0.00 
0.9999514 0.0000483 0.0000004 1.0000000 0.0000000 0.0000000 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 
0.9999999 0.0000000 0.0000001 1.0000000 0.0000000 0.0000000 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 
0.1505061 0.8410184 0.0084755 0.4634851 0.4566059 0.0799090 0.15 0.84 0.01 0.46 0.46 0.08 
0.0099771 0.9900132 0.0000097 0.3695872 0.6304128 0.0000000 0.01 0.99 0.00 0.37 0.63 0.00 
0.6249590 0.3749754 0.0000655 0.6250000 0.3750000 0.0000000 0.62 0.37 0.00 0.63 0.38 0.00 
0.0858028 0.9141972 0.0000000 0.4811590 0.5188410 0.0000000 0.09 0.91 0.00 0.48 0.52 0.00 
0.9983055 0.0016776 0.0000169 0.9188933 0.0811067 0.0000000 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.92 0.08 0.00 
0.9116573 0.0883426 0.0000000 0.7161608 0.2838392 0.0000000 0.91 0.09 0.00 0.72 0.28 0.00 
0.9996404 0.0003596 0.0000000 0.9959687 0.0040313 0.0000000 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 
0.9999999 0.0000001 0.0000000 1.0000000 0.0000000 0.0000000 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 
0.1362781 0.7615133 0.1022086 0.3495682 0.3882557 0.2621761 0.14 0.76 0.10 0.35 0.39 0.26 
0.0099759 0.9898944 0.0001297 0.3695872 0.6304128 0.0000000 0.01 0.99 0.00 0.37 0.63 0.00 
0.6244550 0.3746730 0.0008721 0.6250000 0.3750000 0.0000000 0.62 0.37 0.00 0.63 0.38 0.00 
0.0858028 0.9141971 0.0000001 0.4811590 0.5188410 0.0000000 0.09 0.91 0.00 0.48 0.52 0.00 
0.9980976 0.0016773 0.0002251 0.9188933 0.0811067 0.0000000 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.92 0.08 0.00 
0.9116572 0.0883426 0.0000002 0.7161608 0.2838392 0.0000000 0.91 0.09 0.00 0.72 0.28 0.00 
0.9996404 0.0003596 0.0000000 0.9959687 0.0040313 0.0000000 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 
0.9999999 0.0000001 0.0000000 1.0000000 0.0000000 0.0000000 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 
0.0821296 0.4589352 0.4589352 0.2922592 0.3538704 0.3538704 0.08 0.46 0.46 0.29 0.35 0.35 
0.0099675 0.9890666 0.0009659 0.3350894 0.6097142 0.0551964 0.01 0.99 0.00 0.34 0.61 0.06 
0.6209618 0.3725771 0.0064611 0.6019873 0.3611924 0.0368203 0.62 0.37 0.01 0.60 0.36 0.04 
0.0858027 0.9141964 0.0000009 0.4811590 0.5188410 0.0000000 0.09 0.91 0.00 0.48 0.52 0.00 
0.9966504 0.0016748 0.0016748 0.8820267 0.0589867 0.0589867 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.88 0.06 0.06 
0.9116560 0.0883425 0.0000015 0.7161608 0.2838392 0.0000000 0.91 0.09 0.00 0.72 0.28 0.00 
0.9996401 0.0003596 0.0000004 0.9959687 0.0040313 0.0000000 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 
0.9999998 0.0000001 0.0000001 1.0000000 0.0000000 0.0000000 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 
0.8987738 0.0506131 0.0506131 0.5890507 0.2054746 0.2054746 0.90 0.05 0.05 0.59 0.21 0.21 
0.4997560 0.4997560 0.0004880 0.5000000 0.5000000 0.0000000 0.50 0.50 0.00 0.50 0.50 0.00 
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